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This article will analyze the most significant changes in the manner
in which individuals who are charged with the crime of rape are
prosecuted for that offense. In the last thirty five years, there has been a
steady erosion of the due process rights of those accused of rape. I have
designated the first stage of “reforms,” 2 which affected the arrest, pretrial, and trial phases of rape prosecutions, as the First Wave of rape
reform. The Second Wave are the more recent changes in the law that
have focused on measures, such as sexual registry or civil commitment
statutes, that restrict the freedoms of those convicted of sexual assault in
the hope of enhanced community safety.
A full comprehension of the statutory enactment and judicial
creation of, for example, the doctrine of affirmative consent, 3 requires an
examination of the context in which the doctrine arose. Decisions, such
as that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in M.T.S., 4 or in the legislative
enactments of the Wisconsin Sexual Assault in the Third Degree
statute, 5 or in the Florida Sexual Battery Offense Law, 6 or in the
Criminal Code of the State of Washington 7 did not occur in a vaccum.
As is the case with virtually all of the reforms that this article will
analyze, affirmative consent may be understood as a somewhat natural

2. Rape scholars have consistently used the word “reforms” to refer to the changes in rape
laws which have occurred since the 1970s. This article uses this term reluctantly, since “reform”
indicates positive and progressive change, and I do not believe that all of the changes in the
prosecution of rape have been either positive or progressive. Choice of language can, of course, be
of critical import; those individuals, usually non-lawyers, who have championed “tort reform” have
consciously selected that phrase in order to win popular support for their call for the enactment of
laws to limit plaintiffs’ recovery in product liability as well as in medical malpractice cases.
3. See infra notes 152-206 and accompanying text.
4. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992).
5. WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (3) (2007). The crime is defined as having sexual intercourse with
a person without the consent of that person. Id. Consent is defined in § 940.225(4) as meaning
“words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”
6. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (2007) requires an offender committing the crime of sexual
battery to have acted without the alleged victim’s consent; the Preamble states that commission of
the crime does not “require any force or violence beyond the force and violence that is inherent in
the accomplishment of ‘penetration’ or ‘union.’” The statute requires “intelligent, knowing and
voluntary consent. . . .” Id. at § 794.011(1)(a).
7. “Consent” is defined to mean “that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual
contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2008).
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progression from the “reforms” in rape prosecutions that had their origin
in the mid-1970s. But a thorough understanding of the rather
remarkable revamping of our rape laws demands scrutiny, not only of
the initial reforms, but also of the changes that have taken place in recent
years such as the enactment of the Louisiana statute providing for the
death penalty for aggravated rape 8 and the eliminations of any statute of
limitations requirements for the crime of rape in New York 9 and
Connecticut. 10
I. OVERVIEW OF RAPE REFORM LAW
To be sure, the rape laws in this country had, up until the 1970s,
made it quite difficult to convict even the guilty for the crime of rape.
The peculiarities of rape statutes, coupled with longstanding juror
cynicism toward women who claimed they were raped by an
acquaintance, led to the revelation in the landmark study of jurors by
Kalven and Zeisel in the 1960s that jurors were more inclined to acquit
defendants in rape cases than was true for any other charge. 11 Jurors
were found to focus not just on the legal issues involved relating to force
used and lack of consent, but also to be judgmental as to the alleged
victim’s character and provocative conduct and ways that the woman
could have contributed to the occurrence. 12 When judges were
questioned as to their reactions to jurors’ acquittals of defendants in rape
cases, the judges in almost 50% of the instances would not have been as
lenient as was the jury. 13
There are many long-standing reasons for jurors’ suspicions, and
those suspicions may well reflect stereotypical and sexist views about
the validity of a rape charge. The alleged victim may just be vindictive
because the guy she dated never called back to see her again; women
may subconsciously desire to be raped, fantasize about it and then

8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.42(C) (1996).
9. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2006) (saying a prosecution for first
degree rape can be commenced at any time).
10. In August 2007, the Connecticut governor signed legislation eradicating the statute of
limitations for the six most serious sexual assault crimes as long as the crime had been reported to
the police within five years of the attack and the perpetrator can be identified through DNA
evidence. Gov. Rell Highlights New Law Eliminating Statute of Limitations in Rape Cases with
ST .
NEWS,
Aug.
21,
2007,
available
at
DNA
Evidence,
U.S.
http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=2791&Q=391712. Jodi Rell, the Governor, called
the legislation a “major step forward for crime victims in our state.” Id.
11. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966).
12. Id. at 249-50.
13. Id. at 253-54.
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believe that their fantasy actually occurred; a long-term boyfriend
decided to end the relationship and the rejected woman wished to
retaliate; the complaining witness was just after money and believed that
the threat of bringing a rape charge (particularly against a politician,
celebrity, or sports hero) would lead to a cash settlement. The often
used term “cry rape” is indicative of the traditional suspicion that men,
in particular, have regarding rape accusations. 14 Male jurors may
identify with the male defendant and fear that they themselves may be
subjected in the future to such a charge. This fear, Susan Brownmiller
concluded in her 1975 groundbreaking work on rape, “is based on the
cherished male assumption that female persons tend to lie.” 15
The rape reform movement began in earnest in the 1970s as part of
the feminist movement with leading women’s rights organizations, such
as the National Organization of Women, developing task forces on rape.
Rape laws were viewed as indicative of a patriarchal system of power
and laws, and women’s groups joined with organizations of police and
prosecutors and politicians wanting to be seen as “tough on crime” to
enact a number of highly significant changes to criminal codes across
the country. Claims were made that women were extremely reluctant to
bring rape charges due to undesirable provisions in the criminal codes,
and a groundbreaking work on rape claimed that there may be twenty
times more rape occurring than that which was reported. 16 Reform was
needed because, as another leading feminist wrote, rape was so frequent
an occurrence as to have become a “national pastime.” 17 Women’s lives
were described as being controlled by the fear of rape:
Most women experience fear of rape as a nagging, gnawing sense that
something awful could happen, an angst that keeps them from doing
things they want or need to do. . . . Women’s fear of rape is a sense
that one must always be on guard, vigilant and alert, a feeling that
causes a woman to tighten with anxiety if someone is walking too
closely behind her, especially at night. 18

The goals of the reformers were lofty indeed. The desire was “to

14. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 313, 370
(1975).
15. Id. at 369.
16. Id. at 175. Others, however, believed the ratio to be far lower. See, e.g., M. JOAN
MCDERMOTT, RAPE VICTIMIZATION IN 26 AMERICAN CITIES 43 (1979).
17. Germaine Greer, Seduction Is a Four Letter Word, reprinted in SEXUAL DEVIANCE AND
SEXUAL DEVIANTS 327 (Erich Goade & Richard Troiden eds., 1974).
18. MARGARET GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR: THE SOCIAL COST OF
RAPE 2 (1991).
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improve male behavior, not merely by curbing forcible rape, but also by
eliminating aggressive seduction. . . . The aim here is to abolish the
traditional sexual roles. . . .” 19 Some of the proposed changes “would
potentially shift public perceptions of women and their role in sexual
relationships.” 20 The goals were specifically instrumentalist as well: to
encourage more women to come forward and press charges after a rape,
and to change the rape laws in ways that would be likely to result in a
higher conviction rate of those charged with rape. 21
But it was not just jury prejudice and doubts about the credibility of
women who claimed to be raped that was responsible for the high
acquittal rates, it was the fact that the law itself set up barriers to
conviction that were not true for other crimes. First and foremost,
perhaps, was the requirement that there be corroboration for the
woman’s claim that she had been raped. Our criminal justice system did
not require corroboration for any other crime; were the jury to find an
alleged victim of any other offense to be credible, the jury could convict
solely on the word of that individual. Such was not the case for rape. 22
II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR CORROBORATION
Corroboration of the woman’s claim was required because of the
general acceptance of the notorious claim by Sir Matthew Hale that an
allegation of rape is “easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.” 23
John Henry Wigmore, the American icon of evidence, was even more
damning of a woman’s claim. In the highly influential treatise, Evidence
in Trials at Common Law, 24 Wigmore instructed that the findings of
modern psychiatry have revealed that women’s “psychic complexes are

19. David Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 478 (2000).
20. Nicholas Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an
Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2005).
21. See, e.g., James Galvin, Rape: A Decade of Reform, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 163, 165
(1985).
22. The requirement that there be corroboration for the crime of rape was all the more
problematic since rapes are commonly committed privately in the home of the attacker or victim
and when no witnesses would be present. See, e.g., Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement:
Repeal, Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
23. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (London
Professional Books 1971). Hale was the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England.
This treatise was first published in 1736 and has been enormously significant in the development of
American law.
24. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (James H. Chadbourn
rev. ed., 1970).
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multifarious, distorted by inherent defects, partly by diseased
derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.” 25 But it
was not just that women had such problems, it was that these complexes
led to the “contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. . . one
must infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales
whose falsity could not be exposed.” 26 What Wigmore recommended
and instructed was that, “No judge should ever let a sex-offence charge
go to the jury, unless the female complainant’s social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.” 27
The Model Penal Code, 28 designed by experts in the criminal
justice field to serve as an example of an appropriate criminal code for a
jurisdiction to adopt, 29 stated that there should be no conviction for
sexual offenses “upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged
victim.” 30 Corroboration was required in this unique instance because of
“the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual
activities carried out in private” 31 and the “jury shall be instructed to
evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special
care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness . . . .” 32
Corroboration could take the form of vaginal injuries, deep
scratches or wounds on the woman or man’s body, torn clothing, or
neighbors’ testimony about hearing screams for help. By 1974, 35 states
had rejected the concept of requiring corroboration. 33 Twelve years

25. Id. at 736.
26. Id.
27. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940). See MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE
253-57 (1971) for a review of the literature maintaining that a woman’s subconscious desire to be
raped and violently attacked led to fabrications and fantasies about actually having been raped.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft 1962).
29. Academics and practitioners spent 10 years developing the Code to provide the “basis for
comprehensive legislative reform in every American jurisdiction.” Id. at pmbl. The American Law
Institute claims that in the twenty years following the publication of the Code, thirty-four states
enacted criminal codes based, at least, to some degree, on the Code. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty years
of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 948 (1999).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring). The rejections were straightforward and unambiguous. See, e.g., WASH REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 2008) (“[I]t shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim
be corroborated.”).
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later, only 8 states still required corroboration. 34 There is no state
which, as of 2001, still generally requires corroboration, 35 although
Texas does so when the offense has not been reported until more than a
year after the date of the alleged rape. 36
III. REQUIREMENT OF “UTMOST” OR “REASONABLE” RESISTANCE
Historically, in order for an accused to be convicted of rape, it was
required to be proven that the victim “resisted to the utmost.” As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in 1906: “[T]here must be the most
vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the
woman’s power to resist the penetration of her person, and this must be
shown to persist until the offense is consummated.” 37 It was believed
that any good woman who didn’t want the intercourse to occur, would
fight it off with every bone in her body. As the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated, “a mere tactical surrender in the face of an assumed
superior physical force is not enough. Where the penalty for the
defendant may be supreme, so must resistance be unto the uttermost.” 38
There clearly was a connection between concerns about women
fabricating rape charges and the requirement that to convict someone of
rape, it must be shown that the victim fought and struggled to the
utmost; how else would it be known that the woman hadn’t really
Nevertheless, as years went by, the
desired the intercourse? 39
impracticality of requiring such combative behavior on the part of the
victim became clear. Police departments began to instruct women that,
at times, they should not fight to the utmost; such struggling just resulted
in the victim’s sustaining great physical injuries from an assault that
would accompany the sexual assault. Reformers were able to cite
empirical research which indicated that there are far more serious
injuries for women who resisted a forcible sexual attack. 40 States, in

34. Cassia Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law
Reforms, 39 JURIMETRIC J. 119, 126 (1999).
35. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
374 (7th ed. 2001).
36. Id. at 374 n.33 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.07 (1998)).
37. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wisc. 1906).
38. Moss v. State, 45 So.2d 125, 126 (Miss. 1950).
39. See ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 98 (1984) (saying it is because
women are viewed as temptresses and liars that the police, prosecutors and judges prefer the alleged
victim to have fully resisted the intercourse).
40. See, e.g., AMIR, supra note 27, at 164-71.
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response, began to adopt the reasonable resistance requirement. 41 The
Oregon Supreme Court 42 described this concept: “The woman must
resist by more than mere words. Her resistance must be reasonably
proportionate to her strength and her opportunities.” 43
Reasonable resistance, to be sure, would vary depending on the
circumstances of the attack. If the man possessed a weapon that clearly
would be used if needed to overcome any resistance by the female, then
none ought to be required. Sometimes, reasonable resistance may mean
none at all. 44 If, however, the assault were to occur in an apartment
building in New York City, then screams for help and struggling to
delay the intercourse may prove fruitful; however, there may be no point
in such resistance if one is being attacked in a desolate field. 45 Even
though our common sense might not lead to such a conclusion, studies
have found that it is psychologically beneficial for a woman to have
physically resisted the sexual assault. 46
Surely, when a jury hears testimony about the victim’s physical
resistance, such resistance is of import in determining that there has been
nonconsensual intercourse. A male defendant whose claim is that, “I
thought she was consenting,” is much less likely to be believed if the
jury finds that there was physical resistance on the part of the victim.
Nonetheless, approximately half of the states have changed their rape
laws to no longer require there to have been any physical resistance; 47

41. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 174 A.2d 645, 648 (N.J. App. 1961) (declaring the resist-to-theutmost test to be obsolete).
42. State v. Risen, 235 P.2d 764 (Or. 1951).
43. Id. at 765.
44. The New York State Court of Appeals first expressed this perspective in 1891. “[T]he
extent of the resistance required of an assaulted female is governed by the circumstances of the case,
and the grounds which she has for apprehending the infliction of great bodily harm.” People v.
Connor, 126 N.Y. 278, 281 (N.Y. 1891). See also State v. Terry, 215 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. App.
1965) (saying utmost resistance is to be required no more. The test is whether the woman did
“resist as much as she possibly can under the circumstances”).
45. Traditional Jewish Law is of interest here. Physical resistance may well be evidence of
lack of consent, but has never been required as an element to prove a sexual attack. The crime of
rape has been defined simply as “sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.”
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1548 (1972), cited in Beth C. Miller, A Comparison of American and
Jewish Legal Views on Rape, 5 COLUMB. J. GENDER & L. 182, 194 (1996).
46. See, e.g., Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953,
989-90 (1998). Anderson concluded that resisting the attack causes the victim to engage in less
self-blame, require a shortened period for recovery, and create a greater likelihood in seeking
treatment after the rape. Id.
47. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 329.
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the focus now has been placed on the defendant’s use, or threatened use,
of force. 48
In 1975, the state of Michigan enacted rape reform legislation that
formed the basis for statutory changes in many states; the statute
eliminated any requirement of physical resistance. 49 New York State’s
current rape statute is typical of many present day states in its defining
of the requisite “forcible compulsion” as encompassing either the use of
actual force or the implied or express threat of such use. 50 If threats
articulated by the defendant had paralyzed the capacity of the alleged
victim to resist and had undermined her will, then the statutory
requirement of forcible compulsion has been met. Concerns have often
arisen as to which is of primary significance: the intention of the accused
to have threatened the use of force, or the alleged victim’s belief that
there was such a threat. The New York case of People v. Evans 51
involved a situation where the defendant had told the alleged victim that
“I could kill you, I could rape you. I could hurt you physically.” 52 The
State claimed that those words clearly indicated the defendant’s
intention to threaten the victim, who, perceiving a threat, proceeded to
engage in intercourse with the defendant. 53 The state Supreme Court
Judge presiding at the bench trial, however, determined that the
controlling state of mind regarding whether or not there was a threat of
force was not that of the alleged victim who perceived a threat, but
rather that of the man accused of the rape. 54 Evans had met the 20 year
old college student at La Guardia airport where he had gone as part of
his planned seduction of a vulnerable new arrival to New York City. 55
The defendant posed as a psychologist, and several hours later the young
woman accompanied the defendant to his apartment. The defendant
explained at trial that he uttered the words which were interpreted as
threatening, merely to inform the woman that she should not put herself
in such vulnerable positions in the future; were she confronted in a
similar scenario at some later date with a different man, she may at that

48. Id. The statutory inclusion of the threat to use force was itself a reform. Id. During the
period when utmost resistance was required to have been utilized by the victim, actual force was
required by the perpetrator. Id.
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 1975).
50. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (2006).
51. People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976).
52. Id. at 917.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 920-21.
55. Id. at 915.
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time actually be physically at risk. The Court concluded that there is no
crime when the “words . . . are taken as a threat by the person who hears
them, but are not intended as a threat by the person who utters
them . . . .” 56
IV. RAPE SHIELD LEGISLATION
One of the most significant and far-reaching changes in the
prosecution of rape has been the enactment of what is commonly
referred to as rape shield laws. These laws protect, i.e., shield, the
complaining witness from being asked questions about her sexual
history prior to the occurrence of the rape. There were two primary
reasons for these laws. First, it was believed that many women would
not come forward to report the fact that they’ve been raped if they knew
they’d be subjected to questions about their sexual past. Secondly, there
was great concern that jurors were being unduly influenced and
prejudiced by hearing information about prior sexual involvements of
women who were claiming at trial that they had not consented to
relations with the defendant. It was believed by many that if the woman
had consented to have sexual relations with a number of people in the
past, it was more likely that she had done so with the defendant on the
day in question. Additionally, changes in the rape shield statutes could
promote important policies and “reverse certain antiquated
misconceptions concerning rape.” 57 A lot to ask for.
At common law, questions concerning the prior sexual history of
the alleged rape victim were admissible for two reasons. First, it was
believed that a woman who had been sexually active was a less credible
witness in general. Secondly, a woman who was unchaste—defined as
participating in either pre-marital or extra-marital sex—was thought
more likely to have agreed to have relations with this defendant. A
standard jury instruction that had been used in California illustrates the
point: “A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible
rape, but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented
to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again.” 58
The goal of the reformers to preclude questions about the
complaining witness’s prior sexual involvements gained rapid

56. Id. at 921. The court did acknowledge that the complaining witness indeed “was
intimidated” and “perhaps was terrified.” Id. at 919.
57. Drake v. State, 836 P.2d 52, 54 (Nev. 1992).
58. Harriet Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 783 n.96 (1986) (emphasis added).
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momentum, and within one decade every state had enacted some version
of a rape shield law. The first significant shield law was passed in the
state of Michigan; the 1975 statute has been deemed to constitute “the
most important model for reform.” 59 The language was simple, clear
and to the point: “Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted . . . .” 60
Congress, however, failed to amend the Federal Rules of evidence
until 1978; the “Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act” of that year
eventually became Rule 412 of the Federal Rules. The goals of the
legislation were clear. Senator Joseph Biden described the law as one
which “will eliminate the defense strategy. . . of placing the victim and
her reputation on trial in lieu of the defendant.” 61 President Jimmy
Carter, upon signing the bill into law, stated the law would “end the
public degradation of rape victims” and “prevent a defendant from
making the victim’s private life the issue in the trial.” 62
The shield statutes attempted to avoid not just the re-victimization
of the complaining witness by direct and potentially embarrassing
questioning of her, but also the testimony by prior sexual partners of the
woman, who could inform the jury about her reputation for
promiscuity. 63 The more past sexual involvements of a woman, the
more jurors may see her as being in control of, and responsible for, her
sexual involvement with men in general, and with this defendant in
particular. It is, in fact, common in acquaintance rape situations that the
woman had a history of sexual involvements; it is those women who are
more likely to be socially adventuresome and find themselves in bars or

59. Leigh Bienen, Rape III, National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. RPTR. 171, 172 (1980).
60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1) (West 1991). The Rape shield statutes of some
states attempt to be more comprehensive. The following is a portion of the State of Washington
Rape Shield Statute: “Evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior including but not limited to the
victim’s marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or
sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible . . . .” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.020(2) (2008).
61. 124 Cong. Rec. 36,256 (1978).
62. Statement on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30,
1978). Rule 412 was extended by amendment in 1994 to apply the shield to all criminal cases, not
just those where the defendant was charged with rape.
63. Courts have often highlighted the need to avoid placing the alleged victim on trial as a
justification for rape shield laws. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 227 (1981)
(saying evidence of prior sexual history diverts the jury from its proper focus on the alleged acts of
the defendant).
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clubs where they would meet men interested in sexual encounters in the
first place. 64
Another factor that may impact jurors is the perception that a
woman who has frequently engaged in sexual relations is less likely to
be psychologically damaged by an acquaintance rape than would be the
case for a woman with little or no prior sexual relationships. 65 Jurors
may, consciously or subconsciously, believe in some way that a woman
with an active sexual life takes on an “assumption of risk” that she’ll
meet a guy who won’t take “no” for an answer. What is perceived to be
a “high risk lifestyle” may effectively lead to “contributory negligence.”
But the shield laws have most certainly not been without their
critics. The limitation on the ability of defense counsel to conduct a full
and comprehensive cross examination of the alleged rape victim has
proven to be of much concern. The right to confront one’s accusers is a
basic tenet of our system of criminal justice. The Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor . . . .” 66 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has been
held to incorporate the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, such guarantees
apply to state prosecutions. The Supreme Court, in Washington v.
Texas, 67 cited the 14th Amendment provision that no state “deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law” 68 and
concluded that “the right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and then
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense . . . .” 69 The ability to present relevant testimony on
the defendant’s own behalf, the Court continued, is a “fundamental
element of due process of law.” 70
The goal of the reformers to shift the focus of the trial from the
alleged rape victim (her sexual background, what clothing she may have
been wearing, her presence at a singles’ bar at 2:00 in the morning) to

64. One study of college women found that women who have stated that they have been raped
had, in fact, a greater number of sexual partners than the general population of female students.
Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Characteristics, 9
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 208 (1985).
65. See generally Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trials and Juror’s Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis
of the Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 264,
273, 279 (1979).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67. Wash. v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
68. Id. at 15 n.2.
69. Id. at 19.
70. Id.
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what the defendant allegedly did, has proven to be quite difficult. The
jurors’ focus on mens rea, the defendant’s state of mind, will raise
questions about what the victim herself had been doing which may have
impacted upon the defendant’s perceptions of what was occurring.
There is, for instance, no way of shielding the woman from the fact that
she had gone to a bar, then to the defendant’s apartment in the middle of
the night. Even though at trial the victim is shielded from questions
about her past sexual relations with others, there is no control over what
inferences, prejudices, and conclusions the jurors may form because of
her actions that night.
All rape shield statutes contain exceptions, which do permit
questioning of the alleged victim’s sexual past in the following
instances: a) questions relating to the sexual history with this defendant
can be asked in order for the jury to be able to assess most fairly what
occurred between them that night, 71 b) if the woman has been convicted
of prostitution in the years prior to this occurrence because it’s believed
that the conviction may be seen by the jurors as affecting her credibility,
c) a catch-all category generally providing the trial judge with discretion
to permit questioning if it’s determined to be required to best serve the
interests of justice. 72
The presumption that the victim will be shielded is only that, a
presumption. 73 Judges are left with the overall discretion as to what any
particular trial may demand. In the Kobe Bryant case, where the issue
was whether the acknowledged sex was consensual or forced by the

71. It is generally believed that such information is needed to provide a context for the
relationship between the defendant and the woman who is claiming that she was raped. All states,
whether by statute or court decision, have this exception to the rape shield laws.
72. In Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36 (2004), a case involving the right of a defendant to
engage in cross examination, Justice Scalia emphasized that the framers of the Constitution knew
that judges “could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people . . . [and] were loath to
leave too much discretion in judicial hands.” Id. at 1373. Judges may well choose to act in ways
that are designed to protect themselves from public criticism or controversy and determine that the
safest course of conduct is to just prohibit the questioning.
73. See, for example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (2007), which says:
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s or a witness’s prior or subsequent sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct, and reputation
evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct . . . shall be presumed to be
irrelevant except:
a) Evidence of the victim’s or witness’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the
actor;
b) Evidence of specific instance of sexual activity showing the source or origin or semen,
pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose
of showing that the act or acts charged were or were not committed by the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
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famous basketball player, the judge was confronted with the highly
charged claim that testimony that showed that the alleged victim had
intercourse with another man within fifteen hours after the claimed rape
by Bryant should be permitted “in the interest of justice.” The Colorado
rape shield statute provides that, “if the court finds that the evidence
proposed to be offered regarding the sexual conduct of the victim or
witness is relevant to a material issue to the case, the court shall order
that evidence may be introduced . . . .” 74 Jurors might appropriately
determine that if the victim had been violently raped in Bryant’s hotel
room as claimed, she wouldn’t have so shortly thereafter found another
man with whom to once again have intercourse.
The prosecutor’s case fell apart after of the judge’s ruling that the
rape shield statute in this case would not prohibit defense questions
about the woman engaging in sexual relations with another man within
15 hours after the alleged sexual attack by Bryant. As the Denver
prosecutor told the Court, “the victim has informed us, after much of her
own labored deliberation, that she does not want to proceed with this
trial.” 75 There has been a suspicion in recent years that those who make
such claims against celebrities might be doing so to extort funds in
exchange for keeping silent. Even in the Kobe Bryant case where
criminal charges were dismissed, a handsome civil settlement resulted
just six months later. 76
A judge’s use of discretion may often be guided by an analysis of
the probative aspect versus the prejudicial nature of the proffered
testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for a balancing
between the probative value of the desired evidence versus the
prejudicial impact such evidence would have on the fact finders. 77 To
an extent, this balancing act is what some rape trials entail—a potentially
embarrassing and degrading examination of a woman’s sexual past,
versus the need for the jury to hear all the evidence that may
appropriately have influenced the defendant and all the testimony that

74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(2)(e) (2007).
75. Howard Pankratz & Steve Lipsher, Dismissed Prosecution: Accuser is Unable to Proceed
with Trial Defense: Bryant Apologizes for Actions “That Night,” DENVER POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at
A1.
76. Jon Sarche, Kobe Bryant Settles Civil Suit, Terms Not Disclosed, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 3, 2005.
77. Rule 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
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may prove critical in assessing the reliability and credibility of the
complaining witness.
The Supreme Court, while never specifically ruling as to the
constitutionality of rape shield laws, did give tacit approval to such
statutes in Michigan v. Lucas. 78 The Court, while ruling on a notice
requirement unique to the Michigan statute, noted that the rape shield
protections reflect “a valid legislative determination that rape victims
deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and
unnecessary invasions of privacy.” 79
The Court, however, has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental
import of the right to cross examine one’s accuser. 80 In Davis v.
Alaska, 81 the prosecution maintained that cross examination of the
primary witness testifying against the defendant should not be permitted
to encompass questions about the juvenile delinquency record of that
witness because it would violate the right to privacy and create
embarrassment. 82 Alaska law specifically prohibited cross examination
on such matters in order to protect against public exposure of offenses
committed while a juvenile. The Court acknowledged that the desire to
protect privacy rights was a valid concern, but such concerns were
“outweighed by [the defendant’s] right to probe into the influence of
possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.” 83
The impact of the Davis decision was immediate, but, strangely,
short-lived. Very soon after Davis was decided, a Maryland appeals
court in State v. De Lawder 84 reversed its earlier holding 85 which had
supported the prohibition of defense counsel’s questions concerning the
prior sexual relations of the woman claiming to have been raped by the
defendant. 86 The Maryland court cited the strong language used in

78. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
79. Id. at 149-50.
80. Indeed, the Court has noted that this right dates back to Roman times. Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988). See also Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
81. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
82. Id. at 310. The prosecutor moved, pre-trial, for a protective order to prevent reference to
the witness’s juvenile record by the defense on cross examination. The witness had been
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent at age sixteen due to the commission of two burglaries. Id. at 311.
The prosecutor took the position that exposure of the witness’s juvenile record would impair the
rehabilitative goals of the state. Id. at 319.
83. Id. at 319.
84. State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
85. The Maryland court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis needed to be
applied retroactively. Id. at 455.
86. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

996

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

Davis regarding the critical import of the right of cross examination 87 to
now hold that the objective that the alleged rape victim “fulfill her public
duty to testify free from embarrassment and with her reputation
unblemished must fall before the right of an accused to seek out the truth
in the process of defending himself.” 88 Nonetheless, the momentum for
enactment of rape shield legislation continued after Davis and De
Lawder with, however, some major exceptions to the restriction of the
right of cross examination.
One prime limitation is when the defense wants to introduce
evidence of the alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct to show that the
woman has a motive to lie about the incident with the defendant. The
Supreme Court, in Olden v. Kentucky, 89 considered a situation where
defense claimed that the woman had fabricated the sexual assault in
order to protect herself from her live-in boyfriend’s discovering that she
had cheated on him. 90 The trial court judge prohibited questions
designed to reveal to the jurors the existence of that live-in relationship,
based in part on the judge’s concern that the Kentucky jurors would be
prejudiced against the white complaining witness upon learning that her
boyfriend was black. 91 The trial court refused to permit defense counsel
to question the witness about her living arrangements even after she lied
on the witness stand by stating as part of the prosecutor’s direct
examination that she was living with her mother. 92 The Supreme Court,
citing its holding in Davis v. Alaska, 93 held that “[s]peculation as to the
effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross
examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the
defendant’s] testimony.” 94
The Olden Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment requires the defendant to be able to expose to the jury
facts which may challenge the reliability of a witness. 95 A more
87. The Supreme Court emphasized the import of cross examination as a primary aspect of
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, stating that “[c]ross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis, 415
U.S. at 316.
88. DeLawder, 344 A.2d at 455 (emphasis added).
89. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
90. Id. at 230.
91. Id. at 230, 232.
92. Id. at 230.
93. See supra note 87.
94. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. The Court added that “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in
testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of crossexamination.” Id. at 231.
95. Id.
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common motive to lie about being raped is illustrated in State v.
DeLawder. 96 In that case, the defense claim was that the young girl was
terrified of telling her mother that she had gotten pregnant from
consensual sex with her boyfriend, and chose, instead, to tell her very
strict mother that, “I’ve been raped; now, I am pregnant . . . .” 97
V. JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPT OF RAPE SHIELD
Courts have not only been generally supportive of rape shield
legislation, but have even expanded it beyond the scope of the drafters.
A prime example of this is the decision of the Third Circuit in
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito. 98 The defense had requested
that the trial judge grant its motion to have a psychiatric examination
conducted of the complaining witness. 99 The attorney’s affidavit
submitted to the Court stated that “any number of persons in the
community” had told counsel that the alleged victim “appears to be
often, if not almost constantly, in a ‘spaced out’ or trancelike state; I
have personally observed this.” 100 Counsel added that he had been
informed by individuals that the complainant is addicted to drugs and “is
frequently in altered states of consciousness therefrom.” 101
One would think that evidence of a complaining witness’s use of
“mind-altering [hallucinogenic] drugs” 102 and of a “personality which
fantasizes to extremes” 103 goes to the heart of the overriding issue of the
credibility of the witness. There is no issue presented here relating to
questioning the witness about her prior sexual relations, so one may not
see the relevance of the federal rape shield statute, Rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 104 Yet, the Third Circuit upheld the decision
of the trial court that Rule 412 does apply, not based on the “letter” of
412, but on the “spirit;” 105 the spirit being to prevent the victim from
being put on trial. 106 Such an incursion on the right to cross-exam and

96. State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
97. Id. at 453; see also Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152, 161 (Md. 1993) (saying that evidence
was admissible that suggests the alleged victim had a motive to lie in accusing defendant of rape).
98. Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
105. Scuito, 623 F. 2d at 874-75.
106. Id. at 876 (citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE § 412(01), at 412-19 (1979)).
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confront one’s accusers could well be seen as prohibiting many instances
of relevant questioning that certainly challenges the credibility of one
who accuses another of a crime. A serious and comprehensive attack on
the veracity, honesty, and reliability of a witness’s testimony might well
be characterized as an attempt to put the victim on trial and, therefore, be
improper.
At times, trial courts’ rulings in the name of rape shield statutes
have been unfortunate indeed. Consider the court’s action in Neeley v.
Commonwealth. 107 The alleged victim was a 14 year old white girl who
claimed that a black male had broken into her house and forcibly raped
her. 108 Neeley, a black man, denied ever having entered the house that
night at all. The Commonwealth of Virginia introduced expert evidence
from a technician at a forensic laboratory that a hair which was
“characteristic of hair from a person of African-American descent” was
found on the girl’s cervix. 109 The defendant wished to question the
complainant about the intercourse she had had with her boyfriend, who
was also black, before the alleged rape. Defense wished to counter the
prosecution’s claim that the hair from a black man found on the woman
was evidence of the guilt of the defendant. Defense counsel had an
expert he was prepared to call to testify and who would maintain that the
hair found could well have come from the girl’s boyfriend. 110
The trial court’s ruling in Neeley prohibited the defendant from
introducing evidence to provide an alternative explanation for the hair
that was found on the complainant. The court’s ruling prohibiting any
testimony that would involve evidence of the alleged rape victim’s prior
sexual relations, in the name of protecting the girl from embarrassment,
provides an alarming example of the use of rape shield statutes to thwart
justice. It took a decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia to
conclude that the operation of the statute in this case denied the
defendant his “constitutional rights of compulsory process, confrontation
and due process . . . .” 111
Another instance of a court broadly, and, I suggest, inappropriately,
applying a rape shield statute to encompass sexual conduct other than
the alleged victim’s prior sexual relations, is the Ninth Circuit’s decision

107. Neeley v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 721 (Va. App. 1993).
108. Id. at 722.
109. Id. at 723.
110. Id.
111. Neeley, 437 S.E.2d at 726-27. The court held that the utilization of the rape shield statute
in this instance denied the defendant his constitutional right to present relevant evidence. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7

18

Klein: An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform
KLEIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM

999

in Wood v. Alaska. 112 There was no dispute as to whether or not
intercourse had occurred; the issue before the jury was whether there
was consent. Wood wanted to introduce evidence that prior to the night
in question, the alleged rape victim had told him that she had posed for
photographs for Penthouse magazine, that she had acted in pornographic
films, and that she received payment to engage in sex in a room full of
mirrors while people photographed her. 113 Wood maintained that the
woman had shown him the Penthouse photos 114 and that he perceived
her conduct to have been a sexual come-on. The defendant’s attempts to
bring these issues out before the jury failed because the judge ruled that
such testimony was prohibited under the rape shield law in Alaska. 115
The defendant was convicted of sexual assault. 116
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that since the
conduct Wood desired to introduce was publicly displayed in nationally
distributed magazines and films, no privacy rights of the complainant
would be violated by introducing the information at trial. 117 The Court
also accepted Wood’s claim that the information that the complainant
provided Wood might well have established a certain type of
relationship between the two, but, nevertheless, concluded that the
potential prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value. 118
Furthermore, any introduction of such evidence may have “confused”
the jury. 119
The Court determined that the mere willingness to have posed for
Penthouse and to act in sexual films was of no relevance as to whether
she would have wanted to have had sex with Wood. What the Court
failed to give sufficient weight to is the significance of the woman’s
making a special effort to impart that information to Wood and how he
may have interpreted the motivation and interests of the woman
providing him with such detailed information about her past sexual
conduct. The woman’s discussions, initiated by her, of her pornographic

112. Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 1546.
114. The court accepted this as fact. Id. at 1547.
115. The trial judge issued a pretrial protective order excluding all the above mentioned
evidence. Id. at 1547.
116. Id. The defendant unsuccessfully appealed in the Alaska state courts and the federal
district court denied his habeas corpus writ based on his Sixth Amendment claim. Id. at 1547-48.
117. It was clear that the purpose of the woman’s exposure was to have her images seen by the
public. Id. at 1552. It would be difficult to maintain that the woman would be embarrassed by the
revelation of her photos or acting career.
118. Id. at 1554.
119. Id.
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acting and modeling career, could most certainly be deemed to be
sexually provocative and taken by Wood to mean she was interested in a
sexual relationship with him. The mere facts by themselves that she had
posed nude and acted in pornographic films might appropriately be
precluded by the rape shield statute, but her communications to Wood
about her past and the showing of nude photographs of herself to Wood
are quite another matter. A jury may well have regarded such actions as
more than of “limited probative value,” 120 and more than just “relevant
to a limited degree.” 121
VI. THE MARITAL EXEMPTION FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE
To be sure, one of the most significant reforms in rape law has been
the elimination of the marital exception for the commission of crime of
rape. Once again, we turn for historical perspective to the seminal work
of Lord Matthew Hale: “[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.” 122 The first case in
America to recognize the common law exemption for marital rape was
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Commonwealth v. Fogerty. 123
There are four primary justifications that have been offered over the
years for the marital exception. The first was that the wife was viewed
as the property of the husband and had no legal identity of her own; the
woman, sexual parts included, belonged to the man. 124 Secondly, the
marriage contract was deemed to encompass an agreement for sexual
relations; it was the husband’s conjugal right and his wife was obliged to
obey his commands. 125 Thirdly, it was believed that the state should
simply keep out of the private relationship that exists between a married

120. Id. at 1546.
121. Id. In a case that offers a contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Wood, the court in
People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), held that the defendant should
have been able to make the jury aware of provocative e-mails discussing sado-masochistic sex
between the parties so as to “effectively place the complainant in a somewhat less innocent and
possibly more realistic light.”
122. HALE, supra note 23, at 629.
123. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489 (Mass. 1857).
124. See 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 189 (1941) (saying the wife’s legal existence was
“incorporated into that of the husband”).
125. Such was not the Biblical perspective on sexual activity in marriage. Relations were to
occur only when each party so chose and marital rape was indeed an offense. Miller, supra note 45,
at 207-08.
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couple. As the Commentary to the Model Penal Code’s marital rape
exemption explains, the exception “avoids [an] unwarranted intrusion of
the penal law into the life of the family.” 126 It was also believed that any
involvement of the criminal law after an accusation of rape would cause
any reconciliation between the spouses to be more difficult and would
ultimately harm the marriage and make things even more difficult for
any children involved. 127 Some maintained that the exemption was
required in order to prevent wives from falsely claiming to be raped in
order to gain an advantage in any divorce or child custody litigation.
And, lastly, a rationale of particular controversy has been the claim
that the harm, the injury to a sexually assaulted wife, is far less than the
impact on other women. The Model Penal Code’s Commentary
illustrates this theme: “Where the attacker stands in an ongoing relation
of sexual intimacy, that evil, as distinct from the force used to compel
submission, may well be thought qualitatively different.” 128 There are
many, however, who maintain that the actual psychological harm that
results from such an attack by an intimate who had once been so trusted,
is great indeed. 129 Marital rape may be, in fact, seen as the ultimate
humiliation. 130
In spite of the offensiveness of the “it’s not so bad if the attacker is
someone you’re married to” claim, the focus of the rape reform
movement of the 1970s did not initially include the marital exemption.
However, it is interesting to note that one of the prime concerns of the
first organized women’s movement dating back to the Seneca Falls
Convention of 1848, was to oppose any concept of a man’s right to
engage in coerced sex with his wife. 131
As of early 2008, most states have eliminated the marital
exemption, although some states deem spousal rape to be a less serious

126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (Official Draft & Revised Cmts. 1980).
127. This is a most peculiar view. One would think that when there has been a forceful sexual
assault by a husband of his wife that the marriage had already reached a point where reconciliation
would neither be a goal, nor conceivable.
128. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (Official Draft & Revised Cmts. 1980). The
Commentary does indicate that even though the “drastic sanctions of rape” should not apply in the
spousal context, the charge of assault may well be appropriate. Id.
129. See GERMAINE GREER, SEXUAL DEVIANCE AND SEXUAL DEVIANTS 329-30 (Erich Goode
& Richard R. Troiden eds., 1974) (saying the harm to a woman who is raped by a complete stranger
may well be less than the humiliation resulting from the rape by someone who the woman was
trying to love).
130. Id.
131. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1373, 1377 n.10 (2000).
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offense than either stranger or acquaintance rape. Oklahoma 132 and
Kentucky 133 still retain limited forms of the spousal exception and
exclude the spouse, but not others, from prosecution in instances where
the victim is not mentally able and competent to consent.
This fundamental change in our laws regarding the marital
exemption for rape came not just by legislative action, 134 but from the
judiciary as well. One of the most influential and significant court
decisions was that of the New York State Court of Appeals in People v.
Liberta. 135 The Court held that “there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. . . . We
therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute
to be unconstitutional.” 136 And in spite of the long common law
tradition in England for spousal immunity, 137 in 1991 the House of
Lords eliminated the marital exemption. 138
VII. THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN THE CRIME OF RAPE
A major concern in defining any crime is which mens rea, which
guilty mind, is required to deem one a criminal. Historically, in a rape
prosecution, the guilty defendant must have had the intention to have
intercourse with a woman without her consent. If he thought there was
consent, the act of intercourse would not have constituted the crime of
rape even if the alleged victim was, in fact, not consenting. The extreme
example that is often used to illustrate this point is the case of Director
of Public Prosecutions Respondent v. Morgan Appellant, 139 a 1976

132. Oklahoma’s rape statute does not apply to a spouse in numerous situations such as “where
the victim is incapable through mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary
or permanent, of giving legal consent.” There is no exemption if force or the threat of force is used.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2007) (defining rape).
133. Kentucky exempts spouses who would otherwise be guilty of rape if the victim is
mentally retarded. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (West 2007).
134. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1 (West 1978) (abolishing New Jersey’s marital
exemption in 1978).
135. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d 567 (N.Y. 1984). At the time of that decision, forty states
still retained the marital exemption. Id. at 572.
136. Id. at 573. The Court also found the designation of “he” as the actor and a “woman” as
the victim violated the equal protection clause because it exempted females from liability for
forcible rape. Id. at 577-78. The Court did not proceed to strike the entire statute, however, as
unconstitutional. The rape statute remained but it was deemed to be, from that point on, genderneutral and with no marital exception. Id. at 59.
137. See HALE, supra note 23 and accompanying text; HALE, supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
138. R. Respondent v. R. Appellant, [1991] 1 A.C. 599.
139. R. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.).
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matter before the House of Lords which characterized the facts
surrounding the incident as “somewhat bizarre.” 140
Four members of the British Royal Air Force had been drinking in a
bar when Morgan suggested to his three companions that they return to
his house to have sex with his wife. The three friends testified at trial
that Morgan had told them that his wife would initially struggle and that
this was the only way she would get “turned on,” and that her resistance
would be a mere “pretence,” not to be taken seriously. 141 Morgan led
the three others to believe that his wife, in spite of her protests, would
certainly be consenting to the intercourse. The men admitted that there
was some struggle in the wife’s bedroom, but then all the parties
involved calmed down and engaged in consensual sex. 142 The issue
presented here was clear: Is it rape when a) the alleged victim clearly
objected to the intercourse but, b) the defendants thought, nevertheless,
that there was consent. 143
The House of Lords’ decision is a noted one because it adopts such
an extreme position that is has been an easy target for the rape law
reformers. 144 The trial judge told the jury that the intent of the defendant
was all-controlling as long as it was based on reason and not completely
fanciful. 145 The House of Lords, considering the matter on appeal, went
quite a bit further. Since the mens rea of rape was intent to have
intercourse without consent, as long as the particular defendant was of
the belief, however unreasonable, that there was consent, then no
conviction would be appropriate. 146
Attacks on the House of Lords 147 began the next day with a sharply
critical editorial in The Times of London. 148 The decision “does not
140. Id. at 186
141. Id. at 187, 206.
142. Id. at 206. The alleged victim’s husband was not charged with rape due to the common
law marital exemption existing at the time in Britain. Id. at 205.
143. Id at 192-93. There was a Certificate, under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, that a point
of law of general public importance was to be decided: “Whether in rape a defendant can properly
be convicted notwithstanding that he in fact believed the woman consented if such belief was not
based on reasonable grounds.” Id. at 192.
144. As one commentator noted, “authors of law review articles cannot leave it alone.” John
H. Biebel, Note, I thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault in England and America, 19 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 167 n.106 (1995).
145. Id. at 168. A much earlier case, R. v. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 410, 414, supported this
view.
146. Morgan, [1976] A.C. at 213-15. The answer to the certified question was “No.” See
supra note 143 and accompanying text.
147. For any given appeal of a criminal conviction that is considered by the House of Lords,
only a few of the actual Law Lords decide the case.
148. See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 329 n.67 (quoting
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accord with common sense. . . . the law lords have been unduly
legalistic.” 149 The British public reacted to the Morgan decision with
outrage. 150 The controversy in Britain led to Parliament’s enactment of
a new Sexual Offenses Act which made it clear that a rape would be
committed in cases where a male may have been reckless as to whether
the alleged victim consented to the intercourse. 151 Mere intent on the
defendant’s part would control no longer, the mens rea of recklessness
would suffice.
VIII. THE DOCTRINE OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
Outrage, shock, disbelief, and mockery was the reaction to the case
on the other end of the spectrum, the decision which highlighted the
issue of affirmative consent, State in the Interest of M.T.S. 152 The New
Jersey Supreme Court made it clear in M.T.S. that its decision was
influenced by, and directly responsive to, the goals of the rape reformers.
The New Jersey legislature considered adoption of a criminal code in the
early 1970s which would have been based on the Model Penal Code’s
approach to rape laws, but in 1978 a new Code of Criminal Justice was
enacted. 153 The rape provisions of the code were formulated by the
National Organization of Women (NOW) Task Force on Rape and other
feminist groups. 154 The bill was referred to in the legislature as the
NOW bill, and it passed both houses of the New Jersey legislature and
was signed into law by the Governor. 155
The NOW bill had been closely shaped by the Model Sex Offense
Statute of the Philadelphia Center for Rape Concern. 156 The Center was
a lobbying group for feminists’ interests, and the stated intent of the
Model Statute was to simply “remove all features [of past rape laws]
found to be contrary to the interests of rape victims.” 157 When the New
Jersey Supreme Court determined that it was required to interpret what it
deemed to be vague and crucial language contained in the statute, the

Editorial, TIMES OF LONDON, May 5, 1975, at 15).
149. Id.
150. See Biebel, supra note 144, at 169-70.
151. See id. at 170; supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Sexual Offences
(Amendment) Act, 1976, 24 & 25 Eliz., ch. 82, § 1 (Eng.).
152. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
153. N.J. CODE OF CRIM. J. L. (1978); M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274.
154. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274.
155. Id. at 1274-75.
156. Id. at 1275.
157. Id. (describing the intent of the Model Statute).
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court was guided by the legislative intent and therefore the goals and
interests of the NOW Task Force on Rape and the Philadelphia Center
for Rape Concern. 158 The Court expressed a consciousness that any
definitional task “runs the risk of undermining the basic legislative intent
to reformulate rape law.” 159 To emphasize its desire to be supportive of
the goal to reform the rape laws in the manner in which the backers of
the reforms would have wanted, the Court cited the failure of the
Michigan Supreme Court 160 to adhere to the legislative intent reflected
in the creation of Michigan’s groundbreaking rape reform legislation. 161
M.T.S., a 17 year old boy, 162 had been living at the house of C.G., a
15 year old girl, for five days before the alleged rape occurred. 163
During three of those days, there had been “kissing and necking” and
discussions of intercourse. 164 Although some facts were in dispute, the
trial court concluded—and the Supreme Court affirmed—that C.G. had
consented to partake in a session of “kissing and heavy petting” with
M.T.S. immediately prior to the intercourse. 165 Penetration occurred
without any threat of force and without any statement or action by C.G.
that she did not want the intercourse. 166 C.G. had clearly become upset
after the penetration and the next morning she and her mother filed a
complaint with the police. 167
The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines the crime of
sexual assault as penetration “us[ing] physical force or coercion . . . .” 168
Nowhere in the statute is there any elaboration on physical force.
Although one could well maintain that the words are not ambiguous and
should be applied in accordance with their plain meaning, the Court
concluded to the contrary. “Physical force” does not “evoke a single

158. The Court emphasized that its interpretation of the statute must fully comport “with the
public policy sought to be effectuated by the Legislature.” Id. at 1277.
159. Id. at 1275.
160. The Michigan case that was discussed by the M.T.S. Court was People v. Patterson, 410
N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1987). M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1275.
161. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1975 Michigan statute.
The M.T.S. decision clearly sympathizes with the dissent in the Michigan Patterson case which
“soundly criticized the majority’s position as a distortion of the legislature’s intent . . . .” M.T.S.
609 A.2d at 1275.
162. Initials are commonly used in cases involving juveniles in order to protect the privacy of
the youths.
163. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1268.
164. Id. at 1267-68.
165. Id. at 1267.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1268.
168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 2004).
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meaning that is obvious and plain,” and therefore it became necessary
for the Court to “pursue avenues of construction in order to ascertain the
meaning of that statutory language.” 169 And therein, the examination of
the legislative history and the consideration of the wishes and goals of
the feminist coalition that had proposed and supported adoption of the
statute.
The statute would seem to clearly contain two separate elements.
First, there must be the sexual penetration, and second, there must have
been the use of physical force. The Court, however, concluded that to
require physical force in addition to the act of unwanted penetration
would be “fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative
purpose . . . .” 170 Were there to be penetration without the affirmative
permission of the other individual, that penetration will be deemed to
constitute the statutory requirement of physical force. 171 “[P]hysical
force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not
required for such penetration to be unlawful.” 172
There was some, but little, concession by the court to interactions in
the real world. “Persons need not, of course, expressly announce their
consent to engage in intercourse for there to be affirmative
permission.” 173 The Court concluded that the failure of the alleged
victim to have protested or resisted was of no significance. 174 In fact, a
new shield was created: there is to be no inquiry permitted as to why the
alleged victim did not resist or even protest the sexual penetration, and
there is to be no inquiry as to what the actual desire of the alleged victim
may have been. 175
The defendant, M.T.S., therefore, had committed the crime of
sexual assault even though the penetration followed a period of bedroom
kissing and heavy petting, and even though C.G. had never protested the
initial penetration or resisted in any way. The doctrine of Affirmative
Consent had been established . . . by a unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 176

169. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270.
170. Id. at 1276.
171. Id. at 1277.
172. Id.
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 1279.
175. Id. The inquiry is to be on the conduct or words of the alleged victim that would have led
a reasonable person to have believed that there was affirmative and freely-given permission. Id.
176. Id. at 1279-80. A leading scholar on rape prosecutions has accepted the court’s decision
in M.T.S. for his definition of consent which requires that “. . . at the time of the act of sexual
penetration there are actual words or conduct indicating affirmative, freely given permission to the
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The reaction to the M.T.S. decision was predictable. Women’s
groups, such as the National Organization of Women, applauded the
court’s holding. 177 The Public Policy Analyst for the Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Rape, an organization that counsels rape crisis
organizations, commented that “I haven’t heard of any other court
decision that says ‘No’ will mean ‘No’ and that is simply enough.” 178
The defense attorney in the M.T.S. case, however, sarcastically
suggested that as a result of the decision, “those who are dating should
bring a ‘condom and a consent form’ with them.” 179 The Chair of the
Criminal Law Section of the New Jersey Trial Lawyers Association
commented that the decision “sounds like you have to give a Miranda
warning before you have sexual intercourse . . . .” 180
In addition to the judicially-imposed affirmative consent
and
requirement in New Jersey, the states of Wisconsin 181
Washington 182 have enacted legislation yielding the same result.
Wisconsin’s Sexual Assault statute’s requirement that consent be
illustrated by “words or overt actions” of the alleged victim, has been
challenged on several grounds.
The first was that there was
unconstitutional shift in the burden of proof to the defendant. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, rejected the claim in Gates v.
State. 183 The Court held that under the statute, the prosecutor continued
to have the mandated burden and was “required to prove that the victim
did not by either words or overt actions freely agree to have sexual
contact or intercourse with the defendant.” 184 A second challenge was
made on the basis that it was fundamentally unfair and inappropriate to
require that the defendant show that the victim had demonstrated
affirmative consent in order for the intercourse to be deemed consensual
and not rape. The court in State v. Lederer 185 responded to that claim:
“Defendant contends that two parties may enter into consensual sexual
act of sexual penetration.” STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW 283 (1998).
177. Peggy O’Crowley, Date Rape Redefined: A New Jersey Supreme Court Ruling Will
Change the Way Juries and Couples Look at Sexual Consent, N. JERSEY REC., Aug. 9, 1992, at
A17.
178. Jerry Gray, Court Says Sexual Assault Can Occur Without Force, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1992, at B5.
179. O’Crowley, supra note 177.
180. Id. (quoting D. William Subin).
181. See supra note 5.
182. See supra note 7.
183. Gates v. State, 283 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Wisc. App. 1979).
184. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
185. State v. Lederer, 299 N.W. 2d 457 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1980).
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relations without manifesting freely given consent through words or acts.
We reject this contention as we know of no other means of
communicating consent.” 186
The Washington State rape statute 187 defining consent as requiring
“actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have
sexual intercourse,” was, however, silent as to where the burden lay as to
the showing of consent. The defendant in State v. Camara 188 claimed
that judge’s charge to the jury improperly inferred that the burden was
upon him. The Washington Supreme Court determined that there was
“support in the history and purposes of rape law reform” 189 to conclude
that the intent of the legislature was to shift the burden of proof to the
defense. 190 As a result of the Camara decision, Washington courts
typically included the following instruction to juries in rape cases:
A person is not guilty if the sexual intercourse is consensual.
“Consent” means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, there
are actual words or conduct indicating a freely given agreement to
have sexual intercourse. The burden is on the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the sexual intercourse was
consensual. 191

This instruction was challenged in 2006 in Washington v.
Gregory. 192 The defendant was not claiming that the judge’s instruction
was wrong as to the current state of the law in Washington; 193 the
defendant conceded that the instruction did reflect the court’s holding in
Camara. 194 Gregory was seeking a reversal of the holding in Camara,
but none was forthcoming: “We decline to overrule Camara, and
conclude that the jury instructions here complied with due process.” 195
186. Id. at 460.
187. See supra note 7.
188. State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1989).
189. Id. at 639. One commentator believed that the real motivation of the court was to show to
the electorate that they are not “soft on crime,” and in so doing became hard on the constitution.
David Hirsch, Presumption of Innocence NOT so clear in this State, SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 1991,
at A9.
190. Camara, 781 P.2d at 486-87. The concurring judge was even stronger and concluded that
the “Legislature expressly intended to shift the burden of showing consent to the defendant. . . .” Id.
at 490 (Utter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The judge’s two sentence concurrence offered no
support whatsoever for his conclusion.
191. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1258 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders, J., concurring in
result).
192. Id. at 1224-25 (majority opinion).
193. Id. at 1225.
194. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
195. Gregory, 147 P.3d at 1225. But see the opinion of Judge Sanders in this case wherein the
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Unlike the court decision in New Jersey and the legislative
enactments in Wisconsin and Washington State which permitted
affirmative actions as well as words to show consent, what occurred at
Antioch College in Ohio as a response to two date rape incidents was
more extreme. The reformers in this instance were the Womyn of
Antioch, 196 and the “reform” achieved was that only verbal consent
would suffice to show that the intercourse was consensual and not
criminal. 197 But, however clear the policy may have been as to what
form of consent was mandated, it was vague and ambiguous in other
respects. “If the level of sexual intimacy increases during an
interaction . . . the people involved need to express their clear verbal
consent before moving to that new level.” 198
But sexual relations are not made up of distinct and discrete
components so as to know when a new “level” has been reached and
therefore the need for verbal consent. And what is to be deemed sexual
intimacy? Is holding hands included? Is stroking a partner’s hair a
higher level than having one’s arms around the other’s body in a hug?
The request to proceed must precede the sexual stimulation that often
sets off the desire to continue. The policy didn’t account for the truth
that after some sexual touching there may very well be the desire for
intercourse even though no such desire had existed earlier.
But the greatest weakness of the policy was perhaps in its
requirement that there be consent “each and every time there is sexual
activity.” 199 If the couple were living together and had relations every
night upon undressing and going onto the bed, under the policy there
must still be the series of verbal consents before any new level (whatever
precisely that may be) is reached. The parties’ prior sexual history and

judge finds that placing the burden on the defendant “violates his most fundamental due process
right . . . .” Id. at 1266 (Sanders, J., concurring in result).
196. “Womyn” has been used by some feminsts to protest the masculine root of the word
“women.” See Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than Raped? The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital
Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1121 n. 14 (2004) (noting that the use of “womyn” is an
important symbol of breaking patriarchal linguistic patterns).
197. THE ANTIOCH COLLEGE SEXUAL OFFENSE PREVENTION POLICY (2006), available at
http://www.antioch-college.edu/campus/SOPP (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
198. Id. The Policy made it clear that asking “‘Do you want to have sex with me?’ is not
enough. The request for consent must be specific to each act.” Id. at ¶ 3 (1990). In 1995, the
Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy became known as Antioch College Sexual Offense
Prevention Policy.
199. ANTIOCH COLLEGE SEXUAL OFFENSE PREVENTION POLICY, supra note 197, at 1-2
(Clarifying Points).
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their ongoing relationship do not relax the requirements laid out to
prevent consensual sex from becoming rape. 200
The Antioch approach toward affirmative consent—the consent
must be articulated verbally—has its supporters amongst modern day
reformers targeting legislatures for changes in rape laws. Indeed, the
approach has its virtues—there are not likely to be mistakes arising from
miscommunications—because of the clear need for the “yes, let’s go to
the next level.” A defendant who believed there was consent just
because his live-in girl friend of two years got completely undressed,
went on their bed and threw her arms wide open, will clearly be a sexual
assaulter unless words of consent accompanied the girlfriend’s conduct.
Coded, non-verbal communications such as tongue kissing won’t
suffice.
The Antioch reformers, as tends to be the case of most reformers,
were not modest in their goals. As the Preface to the Sexual Offense
Prevention Policy, effective January 1, 2006, stated, the regulations are
about “empowerment, changing our rape culture, and healing.” 201
Therefore, the policy applies not just to students but to “all . . . persons
who use or visit the Antioch campus, regardless of their relationships to
Antioch . . . .” 202 The College had acted as a locality enacting its own
rape laws where the actus reus of the offense did not have to be
penetration but just any sexual contact or touching; 203 there is,
furthermore, formal and official notice given that “body movements and
non-verbal responses such as moans are not consent.” 204
Any consideration of Affirmative Consent must examine the
dynamic between that doctrine and the concept of mens rea. Mens rea is
a fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system; to be guilty of a
crime one must have had a guilty mind when the act was done. Unless
one had the intention to cause the harm that resulted from one’s conduct,
or the knowledge that is required by the statute (e.g., the crime of
possession of stolen property requires knowledge that the property
indeed had been stolen) a crime is not committed. As Blackstone’s
Commentaries elaborated on the classic Latin principle of mens rea, an
“unwarrantable act, without a vicious will, is no crime at all.” 205 The

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 758.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7

30

Klein: An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform
KLEIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM

1011

existence of knowledge, or intent, is an element of the crime that must
be proven by the prosecutor to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
Traditionally, for the commission of the crime of rape, an
individual must have had knowledge that the other person was not
consenting to the intercourse. The actor must have had the intention to
have had sexual relations with the woman even though the woman did
not wish to engage in the sexual activity.
But what if there is a legitimate mistake of fact? What if the
defendant in M.T.S. 206 did think that after the kissing and petting in the
bed that C.G. wanted to have intercourse? That the intercourse was a
natural progression from what was occurring? That C.G.’s passion in
the foreplay indicated she wanted more? That, in M.T.S.’s experience,
such heated bedtime involvement did lead to both parties desiring
intercourse and nothing C.G. did or said that night indicated otherwise?
Mistake of Fact in our criminal justice system has historically been
recognized as a defense to a crime; mistake of fact can negate the
existence of the statutory requirement of knowledge.
IX. “NO MEANS NO,” SEDUCTION, AND “MEN JUST DON’T GET IT”
The Mistake of Fact defense in the context of rape, however, has
been the target of the rape reformers. The initial phrase used, “No
Means No,” was a clear affirmation that there would be no valid excuse
by an accused who proceeds with intercourse after the “No.” It doesn’t
matter how many Hollywood films the defendant may have seen where
the initial “No” dissolved into a passionate kiss and ecstatic lovemaking
followed by adoration and hugging in the morning. It doesn’t matter
what the accused’s experience had been in the past with women saying
“No” when they really meant “Yes” because they wanted to convey the
impression of Good, and certainly not loose, Girls. It doesn’t matter if
the man had read of the study of undergraduates in Texas 207 which found
that 68.5% of those females sampled reported that even though they had
said “No,” what they meant was “Maybe.” 208 Or if he knew that recent

206. See supra notes 152-175 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
207. Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When
They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (1988).
208. Id. at 874. The students’ responses were based on the following hypothetical situation:
“You were with a guy who wanted to engage in sexual intercourse and you wanted to also, but for
some reason you indicated that you did not want to, although you had every intention to and were
willing to engage in sexual intercourse. In other words, you indicated ‘no’ and you meant ‘yes.’”
Id. (emphasis in original).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

1012

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

studies have found very similar results as the Texas findings across the
country. 209 Or that one study found that 90% of sexually experienced
women who had said “No” when they meant “Yes,” had stated that an
important factor in their initial “No” had been the fear of appearing
promiscuous. 210 Or that some women undergraduates may even offer
token resistance for “game playing” or “manipulative” reasons. 211
What about a “No” that’s given at 7 PM, but the evening activity of
the date—cocktails, dinner, dancing, after-dinner liquor—has brought
the couple closer together and, according to the man, the lovemaking
flowed naturally and passionately at midnight. Is he to be a rapist
because of the 7 PM “No”? Minds change about all kinds of things,
one’s attitude toward sex certainly amongst them. Some men are indeed
successful suitors who have wowed and courted their date, and what had
seemed terribly improbable at the beginning of the evening, may
certainly change. 212
If force is used by the man to get a woman who had said “No” to
change her mind, that is most certainly rape. If the woman who said
“No” physically resisted or protested or said “No” again as the defendant
was attempting intercourse, that would be rape. But if the man has
charmed his date during the course of the evening, if all of his lines and
routines worked, if the woman had become “smitten” and responded to
the man in a manner in which a reasonable person would conclude
indicated that she had changed her mind, then that earlier “No” should
not cause the later intercourse to be deemed rape. Surely it is whether or
not the woman was consenting at the time of the intercourse that must
control.
Seduction is not rape. Seduction implies that a reluctant partner,
even one who had previously said “No,” had been lured to change her
mind—voluntarily so. Even regretting it in the morning and thinking
“how did I ever allow that to happen,” does not transform the earlier
seduction into rape. Were the reformers to achieve a broader definition
of rape so as to encompass situations where an initially reluctant
individual consented to intercourse not due to forcible compulsion but
due to the charm and appeal of a dating partner, our criminal justice
system would not be well served. A very rare instance where seduction
209. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 260.
210. Id. at 362.
211. Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 207, at 877-78.
212. But see Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 215 (1992)
(maintaining that once a woman has said “No,” the man has been alerted to the lack of consent and
strict liability should apply).
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has been criminalized is the Model Penal Code’s deeming it a
misdemeanor if a male induces a female to “participate [in the
intercourse] by a promise of marriage which the actor does not mean to
perform.” 213
The reactions by reformers to the refusal by some courts to accept
that a “No” means “No” is certainly understandable. And relatively
recent cases where courts hold that “verbal protestations” are not
sufficient to show that a rape was committed by the man who proceeds
to intercourse immediately after the protests, do lead to unjust results. 214
It most certainly must be a woman’s choice to decide whether to engage
in intercourse; concepts of autonomy and control over one’s body
demand that such be the case. But is it unreasonable to require that the
man be made aware that the woman did not desire the intercourse even
though the interaction between the two individuals would have led a
reasonable man to think otherwise? Should silence be viewed as a
matter of law to mean “No”?
Rape reformers often use the phrase, “men just don’t get it,” and
hope that changes in rape laws can lead to societal and cultural changes
in the interactions between the sexes. Men must understand, it is
maintained, that a woman may freeze immediately prior to intercourse
and not be able to communicate any negativity and men must not take
that silence as indicating consent. That’s why an affirmative indication
of consent is required; no assumptions ought be made. If the law makes
this clear to men, then men will act far more cautiously, respectfully, and
judiciously. The law must compensate for the failings of men. As one
feminist and rape reform advocate stated, “men are systematically
conditioned not even to notice what women want. They may have not a
glimmer of women’s indifference or revulsion.” 215 It was as though the
mere presence of testosterone prohibited the ability of its possessor to be
respectful of women’s concerns and interests and desires. After all,
“Men Are from Mars and Women Are from Venus.” 216
There is little doubt that alcohol use by either of the two individuals
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(d) (Official Draft 1962).
214. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Supr.Ct. 1992) (saying verbal
protestations are not dispositive or sufficient evidence that a rape had been committed).
215. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 653 (1983).
216. Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus was the title of a longtime bestselling book
highlighting the different perspectives between the sexes. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS,
WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (Harper Collins 1992). Over thirty-million copies of the book have
been sold. Marsvenus.com, http://www.MarsVenus.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). The book has
been translated into forty languages. Id.
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can further enhance miscommunication. Alcohol can lead to impulsive
conduct, a loss of control and a misreading of the cues that are coming
from the other person. The use of alcohol by one or both parties in
acquaintance rape cases may have great impact on juries. Jurors might
view the claim that the sex was non-consensual as having first arisen the
next morning when the woman regretted both having gotten drunk and
sleeping with the guy. But that doesn’t mean that the woman had not
been competent to, and didn’t choose to, consent to intercourse. Jurors
may also consider the level of intoxication in assessing the ability of the
woman to fully remember what had occurred.
X. STRICT LIABILITY AND MISTAKE OF FACT
Requiring affirmative consent clearly takes us beyond the “No
Means No” mandate. But should we go, as some reformers and courts
have advocated, to a Strict Liability perspective on sexual relations?
Under that theory, it matters not what the man thought as to whether
there was consent, and it matters not what the woman may have done to
have indicated to a reasonable person that she was consenting. It will be
rape as long as it is determined afterward that there was no consent. An
accused will be held strictly and completely accountable for his partner’s
lack of consent.
Consider the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Simcock. 217
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that, “[e]ven a good faith belief on
the part of the defendants that the alleged victim consented is not a
defense.” 218 If the jurors were to conclude that there was no consent,
what the defendants knew or intended was of no import. The judge
emphasized to the jurors that “[t]he focus of the offense in rape is lack of
consent on the part of the victim and not the subjective intent of the
defendant while performing the act.” 219 The Court ruled as it did in spite
of its acknowledgement that “[t]he evidence, viewed as a whole, raised
the issue of honest and reasonable mistake.” 220 Three of the defendants
testified that the alleged victim’s actions created the impression that she
welcomed the sexual advances of the men. 221
‘The Simcock decision was expanded by the holding of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 2001 in the matter of

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E. 2d 1137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
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Commonwealth v. Kenny Lopez. 222 The defense had requested the trial
judge to instruct the jurors that if a mistake as to the consent of the
alleged victim was found to be a reasonable one, that would constitute a
Massachusetts judges had frequently given such an
defense. 223
instruction as to a reasonable mistake of fact constituting a defense, 224
but the trial judge in Lopez did not. The Lopez court agreed with the
lower court and concluded that even a reasonable, honest perception on
the part of the defendant as to the victim’s consent is not relevant in a
rape prosecution. 225 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State of
Maine v. Glenn Reed, 226 similarly determined that the state of mind of
the defendant is irrelevant as to a defendant’s guilt of a rape charge; rape
“requires no culpable state of mind.” 227
Such “reforms’ in our rape laws go against the very core of our
concept of criminal responsibility. The Supreme Court in Morissette v.
United States, 228 over fifty years ago, observed that it was basic that a
guilty mental state of mind accompany prohibited conduct. “The
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion.” 229 There are exceptions;
strict liability offenses do exist for some minor crimes. States
commonly do not permit mistake of fact defenses for charges such as
sale of alcohol to a minor. Mistakes as to age are also not typically a
defense to consensual statutory rape changes. 230 But to incarcerate an
individual to what may well prove to be life imprisonment when there
has been no guilty state of mind has simply been unheard of in this
country.
Some go even further. It’s rape not only when the perpetrator
didn’t know there was no consent, it’s rape even though the “victim”

222. Commonwealth v. Kenny Lopez, 745 N.E. 2d 961 (Mass. 2001).
223. Id. at 963-64.
224. See Simcock, 575 N.E. 2d at 1141.
225. Lopez, 745 N.E. 2d at 966 (citing State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J.
1992)).
226. State v. Glenn Reid, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984).
227. Id. at 1296.
228. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
229. Id. at 250.
230. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Official Draft 1962) (saying it is not a defense
if a defendant either did not know the age of the victim or even reasonably believed the person to be
older than ten); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.25 (saying no mens rea is required as to the actor’s
knowledge of the age of the victim); WIS. STAT. § 948.02 (saying a Class B felony is committed
whenever the victim is less than 13 years old, no mens rea required); Commonwealth v. Miller, 385
Mass. 521, 525 (Mass. 1982) (saying a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction informing that a
reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim is a defense).
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didn’t know it. “That a woman does not realize she has been raped does
not, of course, mean that the rape has not occurred.” 231 If one is at a loss
to understand how the defendant can be held accountable for a crime that
even the victim hadn’t perceived of as constituting improper conduct,
two rape reformers explain that “the moral lessons taught by society
make it difficult for many women to understand when they have been
the victim of rape.” 232 And in case one might assume that the fact that
the victim proceeded on subsequent occasions to have intercourse with
the defendant might constitute some evidence that no rape had taken
place, that behavior could rather be explained as nothing more than the
“victim’s need to normalize the situation.” 233 Or, as another rape
scholar maintained, by having consensual sex on a subsequent occasion
with the rapist, the victim is merely attempting to regain control over her
world. 234 Such reasoning may well be used to support a reform that
would preclude questioning the alleged rape victim about any attempts
on her part to initiate further sexual relationship with the accused after
the “rape,” because such evidence would not be deemed probative and
would be highly and unfairly prejudicial—after all, the jurors might
misinterpret the information and confusion might result. 235
XI. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME AND THE EXPERT WITNESS
One major reform effort in rape prosecutions has dealt directly with
weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case arising from victim conduct which
appears to be inconsistent with that of an individual who had just been
sexually assaulted. Prosecutors are often confronted with alleged
victims who, after the rape, had not told anyone of the attack. Not
family, not friends, not police nor doctors. Often the woman went about
business as usual and mentioned nothing about being assaulted until
many days had passed.
The solution for reformers came in the form of

231. Little, supra note 20, at 1358 (emphasis added).
232. Id. (quoting MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER DEKESEREDY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE
COLLEGE CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF MALE PEER SUPPORT 23 (1997)).
233. Id.
234. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING,
FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 63-64 (1988), cited in Little, supra
note 20, at 1358. Warsaw’s comment reflects a survey by Ms. magazine which found that only
twenty-seven percent of those who, as a matter of law, had been raped considered themselves to be
actual rape victims.
235. See supra notes 57-65 for discussion of the justification provided for the enactment of
rape shield legislation.
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psychologists/psychiatrists 236 who would testify at trial as experts on
rape trauma syndrome. 237 The testimony would, in substance, inform
the jurors that they should not conclude that the alleged victim’s conduct
after the rape was evidence that she had not been raped. The victim may
have feared mistreatment by the police and the courts, or a lack of
sympathetic support from family. 238 Some people who have been
sexually attacked become traumatized, unable to discuss with anyone
what had happened because they may have entered a state of denial. 239
Shame and guilt at what the woman might have done to provoke the
attack may also play a role in the victim’s silence. As one judge in
Philadelphia noted, “[u]nlike the victims of any other crime, they [rape
victims] are somehow suspected by society of being partially guilty; they
are imagined to have contributed to the crime through some form of
explicit or implicit seduction, or simply by not being as careful as they
should have been.” 240
Rape trauma can be considered to be a form of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, which the American Psychiatric Association recognizes
to be a pattern of symptoms that develop after exposure to a certain
uniquely stressful situation that is outside the common range of life’s

236. Until 1962, it was generally the rule that only doctors could testify as to the existence of
any mental disorder. In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d.637, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court
held that psychologists with the appropriate knowledge and experience could qualify as experts as
well. Experts in rape trauma can have a variety of titles, see, for example, Clark v. State, 654 So.2d
984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) where the testifying witness was an expert in “Forensic Psychology
With a Specialty With Rape Victims.” In at least one instance, a graduate student in psychology
was qualified as an expert. People v. Stanley, 681 P.2d 302, 305 (Cal. 1984). But see State v.
Willis, 888 P.2d 839, 845 (Kan. 1995) where the court held that rape trauma syndrome was a
medical diagnosis and therefore a social worker would not be a qualified expert.
237. “Syndrome” is defined as “a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and
characterize a particular abnormality.” MIRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed.
1988). Perhaps the most commonly known syndrome is the battered woman syndrome that is used
to support a claim of self defense in a murder or assault trial. There’s been some attempt by war
veterans to use post-traumatic stress to form the basis of a defense when charged with assault. See
Geraldine L. Brotherton, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 17 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 91 (1981-82).
238. See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 143 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5945.1, as recognized by Com v. Cody, 584 A.2d
992 (Pa. 1991) (“Many victims do not even bother to report a rape because they feel the process
they must go through in order to obtain a conviction may be as offensive as the crime.”).
239. To be sure, there is great variation in the ways that victims react to having been raped.
The relationship, if any, that may have existed with the accused is crucial, as is family support, the
victim’s personality traits and prior sexual history, the nature of the attack, and the overall coping
abilities of the individual.
240. Commonwealth v. Gray, Nos. 748-678, Feb. 1980, as reported in Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape, 428 A.2d at 139 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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experiences. 241 The reaction to having been raped may occur in two
distinct phases. The first, the acute phase, may be characterized by a
complete disruption of an individual’s life, including the numbing of
emotional responses. 242 The second phase may begin months after the
rape occurred and entails the victim’s attempt at a long term resolution
of the after-effects of the sexual assault. 243
To be sure, there was initial reluctance by the courts to permit such
testimony. 244 Expert testimony can generally only be admitted upon a
showing that scientific or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to better understand the evidence, and that the testimony is
reliable and based on sufficient facts or data. 245 States “progressed” at
varying speeds as to allowing expert testimony regarding rape trauma;
some states enacted legislation, in others, judicial determinations
occurred. The first case that this author was able to uncover that dealt
directly with the issue was the 1982 Kansas case of State v. Marks. 246
The state Supreme Court found the proposed expert testimony to be
admissible and that rape trauma was a common reaction of one who has
been sexually assaulted. 247 The court found, furthermore, that such
testimony would not improperly invade the province of the jury. 248
The California Supreme Court found otherwise. In People v.
Bledsoe, 249 the court found that the medical purpose for recognizing the
existence of the syndrome was to devise a tool to aid in therapy and
treatment, and not for any determination of whether or not a rape had
indeed occurred. 250 The court held that “permitting a person in the role
of an expert to suggest that because the complainant exhibits some of the
241. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d ed. 1987). More specifically, rape trauma syndrome is the pattern of
psychological symptoms that follow the sexual assault.
242. See, e.g., ANN WOLBERT BURGESS & LYNDA LYTLE HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIM OF
CRISES 37 (1974).
243. See Pamela Wilk, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 417 (1984).
244. The concept of rape trauma syndrome did not really exist until the mid-1970s when
therapists who had been working with rape victims observed typical reactions by those who had
been assaulted and designated those responses as rape trauma syndrome. Id. at 417 n.3.
245. FED. R. EVID. 702.
246. State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982). Although the California appellate court in
People v. Matthews, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) observed that the trial court had
permitted rape trauma expert testimony, no issue concerning this was raised on appeal.
247. Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299.
248. Id.
249. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984).
250. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 300. The court accepted the fact that rape trauma syndrome had,
overall, reached a level of scientific reliability.
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symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the victim was therefore raped,
unfairly prejudices the appellant by creating an aura of special reliability
and trustworthiness.” 251 The Washington Supreme Court in State v.
Black, 252 similarly concluded that such testimony would unfairly harm
and prejudice a defendant and also determined that the concept of rape
trauma syndrome had not been shown to be of sufficient scientific
reliability. 253
Courts prohibiting such proposed expert testimony noted that the
alleged victim could herself certainly testify as to the emotional trauma
which she endured after the rape and explain that such trauma led to her
failure to immediately report the incident to anyone. Furthermore, lay,
but not expert, witnesses, could be called to testify about the emotional
state of the alleged victim. 254 Nevertheless, courts started down the path
of determining that the expert testimony was relevant and appropriate. 255
To be sure, there was an increasing acceptance by the psychiatric and
scientific community of the concept of rape trauma syndrome. So, for
example, by the time that the Vermont Supreme Court considered the
matter in State v. Kinney 256 in the year 2000, the Court found that the
rape trauma expert testimony was “professionally recognized as a type
of post-traumatic stress disorder, and the behavioral characteristics of
rape victims has been the subject of numerous professional studies.” 257
By 2004, the Colorado Court of Appeals was secure in noting that, “[i]t
has been repeatedly held that rape trauma syndrome evidence is
reasonably reliable[,]” and therefore admissible. 258
The expert, in most instances, would not have even interviewed or
professionally evaluated the complainant, and the problems in permitting
such expert testimony are several. First, jurors might infer that an expert
is being permitted to testify as to the manner in which rape victims act
after they’ve been raped because the court has determined that such

251. Id. at 301 (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)).
252. State v. Black, 745 P. 2d 12 (Wash. 1987).
253. Id. at 19.
254. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 301.
255. There was a similar development with the use of experts in battered women’s syndrome
cases where the female defendant claimed to be acting in self defense. Although the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983) held that the concept of
the battered woman syndrome was not generally accepted in the scientific community, such expert
testimony is used currently in virtually all jurisdictions.
256. State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000). Vermont’s Supreme Court had not previously
ruled on the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence. Id.
257. Id.
258. People v. Baenziger, 97 P.3d 271, 275 (Colo. App. 2004) (emphasis added).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

1020

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

evidence is relevant in this case because the alleged victim had indeed
been raped. This very serious concern is typically dealt with by the trial
judge’s instructions to the jury that the expert testimony was not to be
considered as evidence that a rape had actually occurred in the case at
hand. 259 Any experienced trial lawyer will dispute the efficacy of such
an instruction. The jurors will make assumptions about the relevancy of
the expert testimony, and the expert will have bolstered this
complainant’s testimony that she was a victim of rape. That’s the
prosecutor’s goal in calling the expert to testify.
A second problem with such expert testimony is the overt play to
the emotions and passions of the jurors; the expert will describe the
horrid impact on women who have been raped and how traumatized
many become. The expert can give accounts of the destroyed lives of
clients that he or she has treated, and inform that many rape victims
never recover from the assault. Even though the expert is not permitted
to say, “Jurors, I am an expert in dealing with the devastating aftermath
of a rape and the traumatizing impact it can have, and my expertise
enables me to tell you that this complainant was indeed raped,” the
jurors may well conclude that such is the thrust of the testimony. 260 And
that is prejudicial. And that prejudice is not countered, as the Vermont
Supreme Court held it was, by the jurors’ knowledge that “[t]he expert
never interviewed the victim and offered no opinion whether the victim
suffered from rape trauma syndrome or exhibited any of the behavior of
a rape victim.” 261
XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF A PROMPT COMPLAINT
Another object of reform, and one that has met great success, were
the laws requiring a prompt complaint by a woman who has claimed to
have been raped. The expectation that a raped woman will immediately
tell others of the crime dates back to the 13th century judge and legal
scholar Henry de Bracton’s instruction that such a victim “forthwith and
whilst the act is fresh, she ought repair with hue and cry to the
neighboring vills, and there display to honest men the injury done to her,

259. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 22 A.D.3d 769, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (saying any
prejudice to the defendant will be dissipated by the court’s instruction to the jurors).
260. Experts are not to draw legal conclusions; such determinations are for the jurors or the
judge to make.
261. Kinney, 762 A.2d at 843. Instances where the expert would testify that the complainant’s
responses were certainly consistent with women who had been raped, have been deemed error—
although perhaps, harmless. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 768 P.2d 32, 49 (Cal. 1989).
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the blood and her dress stained with blood, and the tearing of her
dress . . . .” 262
The Model Penal Code of 1962 was somewhat more forgiving, the
complainant had up to three months to inform the authorities. The
Code’s concern was that any longer period of time would then be one
which could include women who had consensual sex but subsequently
discovered that they had become pregnant. Such knowledge “might
change a willing participant in the sex act into a vindictive complainant,
as well as the sound reasoning that one who has, in fact, been subjected
to an act of violence will not delay in bringing the offense to the
attention of authorities.” 263 The Commentary to the Code added that an
objective, fixed period of time was required due to the “dangers of
blackmail or psychopathy in the complainant.” 264 As of 2004, only three
states—California, Illinois and South Carolina—retained a requirement
for a prompt complaint, and then only in the spousal abuse context. 265
XIII. ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT’S PRIOR
CRIMINAL RECORD
It is a basic tenet of our criminal justice system that jurors are not to
be informed of any prior criminal record of the defendant. The rationale
is that jurors must focus exclusively on the facts of the case on trial and
determine whether each element of the crime charged has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Were the jurors in a robbery case to be told
of the defendant’s prior robbery convictions, they might assume that if
the defendant has done it before, he probably did it this time as well—
even though proof is lacking. That is the reason that Federal Rule
404(b) provides that, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” 266
The one standard exception to the rule that jurors are not to be
262. HENRICI DE BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGILAE 483 (Sir Travers
Twiss trans., 1879), cited in Michelle Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U.L.
REV. 945, 947 n.5 (2004). The “hue and cry” language was picked up by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court centuries later: “The lack of evidence of hue and cry that one might expect to ensue from rape
casts doubt on the existence of the rape itself.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327, 1332
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(23) cmt. at 265 (Official Draft 1962).
264. Id.
265. Anderson, supra note 262, at 964.
266. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Evidence of crimes or other bad acts may be admissible to show
proof of preparation, plan, motive or opportunity. Id.
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informed of the defendant’s prior criminal record is when the defendant
takes the stand to testify. At such times, the defendant, as is the case
with all witnesses, is subject to an attack on his credibility and prior bad
acts are fair game. 267 However, jurors in such instances are instructed
by the court that they should not consider the prior crimes as in any way
indicating that the defendant committed the crime for which he is on
trial. The past criminal record is only to be used as part of a
consideration of the defendant’s credibility while on the witness stand.
Pretrial hearings will often restrict the crimes which can be raised by the
prosecutor at trial, and the more similar the prior crime is to the one on
trial, the more likely it will be that no mention of the crime can occur in
cross examination of the defendant because of its highly prejudicial
nature.
But a rape trial is different; there have been “reforms.” Federal
Rule of Evidence 413 provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which the
defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.” 268 The jury is to be informed of the defendant’s
prior acts whether or not the defendant takes the stand.
An analysis of the Congressional Record reveals the goals of the
legislation. First, there is an assumption that individuals who commit
crimes of sexual assault are predisposed to repeat such acts, therefore,
propensity evidence has a relevance unusual for other criminal cases.
Secondly, there are the reasons generally provided as the rationale for
enactment of changes in rape laws—victims are often not believed so
additional forms of evidence may be needed to obtain a conviction, 269
victims will be more likely to come forth to prosecute if they believe that
there is a greater likelihood of the conviction of the defendant.
The import and need for such evidence at trial was highlighted by
Congressional leaders. Former Vice Presidential Candidate Robert
Dole, Minority Leader of the Senate at the time, was direct when
speaking of the need for the new rule: It’s an “entirely sound perception
that evidence of this type is frequently of critical importance in
establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and that concealing it
from the jury often carries a grave risk that such criminal will be turned

267. FED. R. EVID. 609.
268. FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
269. See Christina Wells & Erin Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 127, 140-41 (2001).
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loose to claim other victims.” 270 The “grave risk” is that the defendant’s
trial may have all the safeguards that protect the accused throughout our
justice system. The “grave risk” is that the prosecutors would not be
able to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt if they played by the
regular rules, so permit them to utilize this prejudicial information that
has always been prohibited in the past.
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure had strenuously argued that this proposed revision to the
Federal Rules of Evidence could “diminish significantly the protections
that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases . . . against
undue prejudice.” 271 The Committee had received a report from the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules which revealed strong
opposition by the legal profession to the proposed revision of the Federal
Rules.
The overwhelming majority of lawyers, judges, legal
organizations and law professors on the Advisory Committee concluded
that the rules would permit the admission at trial of unfairly prejudicial
evidence. 272 The Committee, therefore, recommended to Congress that
the proposed revisions not be adopted. 273 The revisions, the Committee
determined, were neither based on nor supported by empirical
evidence. 274
Federal Rule 413 was not restricted to prior criminal convictions or
even arrests of the defendant, rather, any form of evidence of
commission of a prior sexual offense would be admissible. This could
clearly lead to trials within trials whereby the prosecutor would call
individuals who had claimed to have been attacked to the stand to
present evidence about what happened on some former occasion, and the
defendant would proceed to engage in a defense against these old
charges. Were Rule 413 to have permitted the admission only of prior
convictions, that would have presented problems, but the admission of
all forms of evidence opens the doors to a host of potential difficulties.
Furthermore, the burden on the prosecutor to prove to the court that the
prior offense occurred is not the traditional beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, but only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 275
270. 137 CONG. REC. 4927 (Apr. 24, 1991), cited in Wells & Motley, supra note 269, at 142
n.60 (emphasis added).
271. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
CASES, reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 53 (1995).
272. FED. R. EVID. 413, 28 U.S.C.A., at III (Discussion).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (saying the
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The dangers are twofold, at least. Information about prior claims of
sexual assault against the defendant may well prompt the jurors to
desire, whether consciously or subconsciously, to convict the individual
for his past uncharged crimes. The defendant may be convicted for
being a bad person, even when the current charges against the defendant
were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And there is no time limit
imposed as to required proximity of the bad acts to the charged criminal
conduct upon which the trial is based. The jurors might just conclude
that even though the current charges have not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, this is a bad guy who we do not wish to see on the
streets.
Congressional action, however, reflected the political forces of the
day. The coalition of women’s groups and the ‘get tough on crime’
adherents won out over the opposition of the legal profession. The
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, adding what
was to be a new Federal Rule of Evidence 413, was passed. Another
“reform” had occurred.
The rationale behind rape shield laws is that prior conduct of the
victim should have no impact on an assessment of what occurred as to
the incident on trial. But as to the defendant, evidence of prior conduct
is to be allowed with the inference that “if he did it in the past, he did it
this time as well.” 276 Such a determination, one not based on fact or
evidence, was exactly what rape shield laws were designed to, and do,
guard against as to the alleged victim. The accuser is protected, the
accused is not.
XIV. THE ANONYMOUS VICTIM: PROTECTING THE IDENTITY OF THE
ACCUSER
Rape law reforms have led, as well, to changes relating to revealing
the identity of the woman who is claiming to have been raped. Our
system of justice has required that the court process be an open one—
trials are public. Defendants as well as accusers are referred to by name.
The only times, historically, that the public has been kept out of the
courtroom is when an undercover police officer is testifying and there is
district court is to make a preliminary determination that the jury could believe by a preponderance
of the evidence that the prior offense did occur). See generally Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005).
276. One study found that there was a strong relationship between jurors’ knowledge of the
prior criminal record of a defendant and conviction at a rape trial where consent is the issue. Gary
LaFree, et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32
SOC. PROBS. 389 (1985).
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a need to preserve the officer’s role as someone who is not known to be
a police officer. The only other instances when names have not been
used is when juveniles are involved. On occasion, the court, in a manner
similar to the way a judge may impose a gag order on attorneys, may
prohibit the media from disclosing any information which may identify
the victim.
To be sure, a defendant accused of rape is publicly so charged.
Newspapers will headline the name of any well known celebrity or
sports figure, and even if ultimately found to be innocent, the reputation
of the accused may be forever tarnished. But the media has been
increasingly protective of the alleged victim; often such non-disclosure
of the woman’s identity is self-imposed by the news sources. A
somewhat peculiar example of self-censorship is the policy of the
Denver Post, the most highly regarded newspaper in Colorado, in the
celebrated Kobe Bryant matter. 277 After the prosecutor’s dismissal of
the case against Bryant because the alleged victim had no longer wished
to proceed, the civil case which had been filed three weeks before the
dismissal continued in the federal court. By that time, the accuser’s
name had been widely reported in numerous websites and used any
number of times in court. Nevertheless, the Post continued to protect the
somewhat discredited alleged victim. The Post took what it deemed to
be the high road: “Though her identity will be available to anyone who
attends the federal trial or reads court documents, and many in the
community know her name, it is not the same as [the Post’s] publishing
her name . . . .” 278
An increasing number of states have enacted statutes prohibiting
identification of a woman who is alleging that she has been raped. 279
The most common policy arguments presented in support of such
legislation have been that the privacy of someone who has been sexually
assaulted ought to be protected, and more women might report a rape to
the authorities if they believed that their identity would be protected.
Certainly, it is desirable to avoid additional humiliation to a woman who
has been sexually assaulted. Certainly, it is a legitimate state interest to
encourage those who have been victimized to report the perpetrator to
the police for arrest and prosecution. And certainly, as internet use
rapidly increases throughout the world, the potential exposure of anyone

277. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
278. A Note to Our Readers, THE DENVER POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A2.
279. See Daniel Murdock, A Compelling State Interest: Constructing a Statutory Framework
for Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1177 (2007).
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involved in a trial to universal comment and critique has expanded
exponentially.
The non-disclosure statute in Florida, one of the first states to enact
such a ban, provided that, “No person shall print, publish, or broadcast,
or cause to allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any
instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual
offense . . . .” 280 In spite of this prohibition, a newspaper did proceed to
publish a rape victim’s name and was ultimately found to be civilly
liable. 281 The newspaper was ordered to pay $100,000 in punitive and
compensatory damages to the rape victim whose name had been
published. 282 The Supreme Court, however, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 283
found the statute unconstitutional. The primary focus of the Court’s
holding was that the Florida Star had legally obtained from court records
the victim’s name. 284 An additional finding of the Court was that the
statute was overly-broad in that it applied even in circumstances when
the victim was already known to the community or when the victim
herself sought the attention of the media. 285
Some states attempted to protect the alleged victim’s identification
by enacting legislation which would ban the public, press included, from
the courtroom in certain instances. Massachusetts passed a statute
excluding the public when a minor who has claimed to have been
sexually assaulted is testifying. 286 Once again, the Court in Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court 287 found the state’s attempt to be
unconstitutional. 288 The Court emphasized the importance for the public
to be able to exercise the constitutionally protected right to gain access

280. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1981).
281. An earlier Supreme Court case, Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
concerned a Georgia statute which criminalized publication of the name of an alleged victim in a
sexual assault case. The Court sided with the media, Cox Broadcasting, and emphasized the crucial
role of the press in guaranteeing that trials be fair by public scrutiny of the judicial process. Id. at
492. Punishing the media for disclosure could well encourage “timidity and self-censorship and
very likely lead to suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and that should be
made available to the public.” Id. at 496.
282. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 538.
285. Id. at 539. The Court made it clear that there may be some instances where a publication
could be punished for publishing a rape victim name. Id. at 541.
286. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 2008).
287. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
288. Id. at 610.
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to trials, 289 one function of which is to “serve as a check upon the
judicial process . . . .” 290 Whereas the Court did note the compelling
state interest in protecting juvenile victims, such interest did not excuse
the compulsory courtroom closure. 291
Since in both Florida Star 292 and Globe Newspaper, 293 the Court
emphasized that the victim’s identity had been revealed in the court
records prior to publication causing the information to be readily
available to the public, states responded by attempting to prevent the
government itself from identifying the accuser in its official court and
police records. 294 As of 2007, eleven states have enacted laws 295 which
provide for non-disclosure of the victim’s name, but vary as to the other
information that is similarly deemed to be protected. 296 Some states go
as far as to prohibit court papers from providing “details of the alleged
offense” itself. 297
The major concern raised by keeping the victim anonymous is the
damage done to the presumption of innocence. If it is perceived that the
victim’s name is not released so that she will be protected from further
humiliation and victimization, there is an assumption that indeed she has
been raped as claimed. Those who bring false charges would not be
deemed to be in need of such protections from public scrutiny; when an
alleged victim’s name is not released, it will be assumed that is because
she is indeed a victim. She has been subjected to great harm, she has
been violated, her identity needs to be kept secret, she has been raped.
Some women’s advocates believe that laws prohibiting disclosure
of alleged rape victims continues and perpetuates the concept that the
victim is shamed, stigmatized and disgraced. A former President of
National Organization of Women concluded that prohibiting disclosure

289. Id. at 604.
290. Id. at 606.
291. Id. at 607.
292. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
293. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
294. Murdock, supra note 279, at 1186 n.99. The Court had as early as 1979 in Smith v. Daily
Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979), a case involving a newspaper which had published details about a
juvenile defendant, determined that when “a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about
a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.” Id. at 103.
295. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming enacted such statutes. Murdock, supra note 279, at 1186 n.99.
296. Id. at 1188.
297. See Murdock, supra note 279, at 1189 n.119 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.11
(West 2007)); Murdock, supra note 279, at 1189 n.119 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-6-22
(1988)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

47

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

1028

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

“merely establishes [the victim] as an outcast . . . .” 298 The feminist
leader’s recommendation was to “Pull off the veil of shame. Print the
name.” 299
Like many issues in rape prosecutions, any non-disclosure of the
victim’s name requires a balancing test. One middle ground would be to
let the alleged victim make the choice and only in instances where the
woman clearly indicates that she does not want her name disclosed,
would her identity be kept secret. But such a compromise would still
impact upon the First Amendment and freedom of the press; such a
policy may still lead to perceived inequities when the defendant’s
identity is plastered on the front pages of newspapers and his life torn
apart as was the case with each of the three Duke University lacrosse
players. 300 And, such a policy could still negate the presumption of
innocence for the defendant who claims that there was, in fact, no
victim, and that the sex was consensual.
XV. PROHIBITING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE VICTIM’S CLOTHING AT THE
TIME OF RAPE
The reform of rape laws has led to prohibiting disclosure of more
than just the prior sexual history or name of the alleged victim, many
states now prohibit any mention to be made of the clothing that the
complainant was wearing on the occasion where she and the defendant
had been together before the intercourse occurred. The Criminal
Procedure Law of New York State is typical: “Evidence of the manner in
which the victim was dressed at the time of the commission of an
offense may not be admitted in a prosecution for any [rape]
offense. . . .” 301
298. Kevin O’Brien, South Carolina: Last Haven for Rape Victim Privacy?, 50 S.C. L. REV.
873, 880 n.69 (1999) (citing Karen DeCrow, Stop Treating Victims as Pariahs; Print Names, USA
TODAY, Apr. 4, 1990, at 8A).
299. Id. at 880 n.70.
300. Those claiming to have suffered from the now generally perceived to be false charges of
rape include more than three dozen Duke Lacrosse Team Players. A federal lawsuit against the
University and the city of Durham claims that the players suffered emotional distress and invasion
of their right to privacy because of the unqualified support of the prosecutor’s case and the negative
treatment of the players. Associated Press, North Carolina: Lacrosse Players Sue, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2008, at A17.
301. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.48 (Consol. 2007). The statute does permit the admission of
such evidence were a court to determine that the interests of justice so required. See also 2004 La.
Acts 676 § 4, art. 412.1 (prohibiting admission of the “manner and style” of the victim’s attire as
evidence that the victim consented to or encouraged the intercourse); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2015.1 (1997) (replaced by N.D. R. EVID. 412) (complainant’s dress was generally inadmissible unless
the court finds the evidence to be material and highly probative).
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The genesis of these laws can be traced back, in part, to the
country’s shocked reaction to a jury verdict acquitting a man who was
charged with a knife-point kidnapping and sexual assault in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida. The victim in the case had been dressed in a very
short, lace skirt, a tank top, and a leather belt; she was wearing no
underwear. 302 The defense offered these items into evidence at trial.
The jury acquitted the defendant. 303 Life would have gone on as usual
had it not been for the presence of a member of the press in the
courtroom, and the willingness of the jurors to explain their unanimous
vote to acquit. 304 “We all feel she asked for it for the way she was
dressed,” said the jury foreman. 305 “The way she was dressed with that
skirt, you could see everything she had,” the foreman continued. 306
Then he added the kicker, “she was advertising for sex.” 307 Another
juror added, “she was obviously dressed for a good time.” 308
The verdict drew both national attention as well as outrage. 309 A
New York attorney with the National Organization of Women’s Legal
Defense and Education Fund claimed that the case showed that “[i]n
most rape trials, it’s the victim, not the suspect, who’s on trial.” 310 The
director of a Sexual Assault Treatment Center in Florida stated that the
verdict could have a chilling effect on rape cases and discourage victims
from coming forward. 311 The fact that the defendant pled guilty two
months afterward to having committed a rape in Georgia, 312 just
strengthened the perception that he had been guilty of the Florida rape
but acquitted because the jury had blamed the victim.
Reform was quick in coming. The jurors’ claim that somehow the
302. Kevin Davis, Rape Verdict Delivers Outburst of Controversy, SOUTH FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1989.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Cynthia Tucker, Glorifying the Use of Force Against Women Distorts True Nature of
Rape, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1989.
306. Associated Press, Miniskirt Cited in Rape Acquittal, WICHITA EAGLE, Oct. 6, 1989.
307. Davis, supra note 302. America is not the only country where such views prevail. An
Amnesty International survey in Britain found that 25% of Britons believe that if a woman is
wearing provocative clothing, she is partly to blame for the rape, especially if she had been
drinking. Tom Parry, Shock Rape Survey: Asking for it, THE MIRROR, Nov. 21, 2005.
308. Tucker, supra note 305. See also Donna Williams Lewis, Acquitted in Florida, He’s
Guilty in Dekalb, Accused Admits Rape to Spare Georgia Victim, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 6,
1989.
309. Bills That Passed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 3, 1990.
310. Davis, supra note 302.
311. Id.
312. Lewis, supra note 308. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the rape and
received a 20-year concurrent sentence for the kidnapping of the victim of the rape. Id.
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victim had precipitated the rape provided the impetus for a reform that
few had previously seriously considered. Even though the jurors’
blaming-the-victim was nothing so unusual for those who have analyzed
rape trials, the spectacle of defense counsel pointing in court to the
clothes worn by the woman and implying, “What do you expect?” was
horrifying. Whereas jurors had in the past concluded that a woman who
is out drinking at a bar and then goes to a man’s apartment at 3 AM may
somehow have contributed to a defendant’s belief that there was to be
consent for sex, the claim that “I knew she wanted sex by the way she
was dressed,” was qualitatively different. A woman’s right to
autonomy, to freedom, certainly includes the right to choose what
clothing to wear without fear that such decision may be interpreted to
indicate that she is consenting to have intercourse. It is totally
inappropriate to conclude that just because the accuser was dressed in a
certain way when she arrived at the defendant’s house that she wanted to
have sex—her choice of clothing is by no means determinative of the
issue. The following bill passed the Florida legislature and was signed
into law within nine months of the jury verdict: “[E]vidence presented
for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time
of the offense incited the sexual battery shall not be admitted into
evidence. . . .” 313
XVI. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WAVE OF REFORMS
I will refer to the reforms discussed up to this point of the article as
the First Wave of changes relating to rape prosecutions. The reforms’
primary goals were to make it easier to convict individuals accused of
rape and to encourage more women who had been sexually attacked to
report the attack to the police and choose to fully participate in the
subsequent court proceedings. If a potential rapist believes that a
possible victim is much more likely to prosecute under a system where
she, and not he, would get legal protections and support, then perhaps
the incidence of rape would be diminished. If the potential rapist
believes that there is a far greater likelihood that any rape he committed
would lead to a conviction, one would expect a rather sharp downturn in
the incidence of rape.
However, analysis of the impact of these reforms has shown that
the expected gains have not been achieved. The most thorough
examination, conducted by Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney, of the

313. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (West 2008).
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percentage of indictments that actually resulted in convictions found
there to be no correlation between changes in rape laws and convictions
in five of the six jurisdictions studied. 314 In Detroit, unlike Washington,
D.C., Atlanta, Chicago, Houston and Philadelphia, there may have been
some discernible advances. 315
What are the most significant factors to be examining in assessing
the impact of the reforms? Does an increase in the number of rapes
reported mean that more women feel freer to go to the authorities
(showing a benefit from the rape reforms) or that there are actual
increases in the occurrences of the rapes? Should the amount of bail that
is set upon initial arraignment be used to show that an accusation of rape
is being treated more harshly if the bail is being set at higher levels than
in the past?
In 1993, Ronet Bachman and Raymond Paternoster attempted to
assess results of the reforms beginning twenty years earlier. 316 It was
found, however, the law reforms had not significantly impacted either
the reporting rates of victims or the responses to the reports by the
criminal justice system. 317 The one positive finding was that those who
were ultimately convicted of rape were somewhat more likely to receive
prison sentences than had previously been the case. 318 One must bear in
mind that harsher treatment of those accused of rape may just be
reflective of the overall toughening of our sentencing laws. The
nationwide trend toward mandatory and harsher sentences has had an
impact on rapist and non-rapist alike.
After a thorough review and survey of the existing empirical
studies of the impact of the rape reforms, two researchers concluded that
“[t]here is growing evidence that . . . the legal reforms have generally
had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases, or the proportions
of rapists who are prosecuted and convicted.” 319 And, significantly, the
researchers conclude that the crime of rape continues to be
underreported. 320 A more recent report analyzing data emerging from

314. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPACT 160 (1992).
315. Id.
316. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape
Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 554 (1993).
317. Id. at 573.
318. Id. at 574.
319. David Bryden & Sonya Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997).
320. Id. at 1220-21.
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statistical studies of the impact of rape reforms also concluded that there
was no showing that the reforms have met the expected goals. 321
One comprehensive study of the impact of the groundbreaking
Michigan rape reform statute which was enacted in 1975 322 concluded
that the reforms had not even led to subtle changes and that the
“reformers had unrealistic expectations for the rape law reforms.” 323
The failure of the reforms in Michigan to have led to a higher incidence
of reporting by rape victims is troubling. The enactment of the statute
was accompanied by a great amount of publicity which certainly
attempted to make women aware of the protections—for example,
prohibition of questions about prior sexual conduct—that they were now
being afforded. Women were informed that there was no longer any
need to show that they had engaged in any form of physical resistance,
and that no corroboration was required.
The rape reforms were premised on the belief that more women
would trust the police and prosecutors to support their claim and that
changes in the evidentiary laws regarding rape would make it easier to
obtain convictions. The lack of increase in the percentage of those who
have been raped who then report the rape is a strong indication of the
failure, on one level, of the reforms. But perhaps a more important
question is, have the reforms led to an actual downturn in the
commission of rapes? Do potential rapists understand how the changes
in the laws have certainly increased the likelihood of conviction for the
commission of rape? An extensive and comprehensive review of that
very question concluded that there is no correlation between the extent
of reform of the rape laws in a state and the numbers of rapes
committed. 324 The enactment of reforms has not diminished the
frequency of sexual assaults. 325
XVII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LAWS FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE
The Second Wave of reforms do not concern what actually occurs
at the trial, but reflect continuing and recent attempts to change the laws
to reflect a harsher treatment of the crime itself. There have, for
321. Stacy Futter & Walter Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case
Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 111 (2001).
322. See supra note 59-60 and accompanying text.
323. Cassia Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the Processing of
Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 861, 884 (1996).
324. Ronald Berger et al., The Impact of Rape Law Reform: An Aggregate Analysis of Police
Reports and Arrests, 19 CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 1, 5, 19 (1994).
325. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7

52

Klein: An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform
KLEIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM

1033

example, been radical, not just reformist, changes in the statute of
limitations laws as applied to rapes.
Statutes of limitations have been a fundamental aspect of our
criminal justice system. The general rule is that an individual cannot be
prosecuted for a criminal act unless he has been arrested for the crime
within a specified period of time from the date of the commission of the
crime. The most common time frames across the country are a two to
three year period between the date of the crime and arrest for
misdemeanors, and a five year period for felonies. 326
The primary function of the statutes are, as the Supreme Court
noted in Toussie v. United States, 327 to “protect individuals from having
to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have
become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of
official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.” 328 The New
York Court of Appeals provided an additional justification of the
statutes: the laws “encourage law enforcement officials promptly to
investigate suspected criminal activity.” 329 In the rape context, it would
prove most difficult for an individual who is accused of a sexual assault
many years after it allegedly occurred to be able to provide a full
defense; witnesses, alibi testimony, or any records that might have been
relevant may no longer be available. And since corroboration is no
longer required, a conviction could result from the unsubstantiated claim
of the alleged victim that a rape had occurred in the distant past.
New York, like many states, had an exception to the general five
year statute of limitations for felonies. Category “A” felonies, most
notably murder and kidnapping, were the primary exceptions, 330 a
prosecution “for any other felony must be commenced within five years
of the commission thereof.” 331 Any other felony, that is, except – as of
2006 – rape. 332 A prosecution based on the occurrence of a rape, “may
be commenced at any time.” 333 Some states have not gone quite as far

326. Statutes of limitations are a standard part of our civil system as well. Unless an individual
files a claim within a specified period of time, he will lose the right to pursue the cause of action.
327. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
328. Id. at 114-15.
329. People v. Seda, 93 N.Y.2d 307, 311 (N.Y. 1999).
330. N.Y CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (Consol. 2008). See also Vermont which has no
statute of limitations for aggravated sexual assault. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4501(a) (2008).
331. N.Y CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(b) (Consol. 2008).
332. The exceptions included other sexual abuse statutes of the New York Penal Law as well.
2006 N.Y. Laws 3. The law extended the time for the rape victim to commence a civil action based
on sexual abuse from one to five years. Id.
333. Id. (emphasis added). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-401 (West 2008) (stating there is
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as New York. Massachusetts, in 2006, instituted a fifteen year period
for the defendant to be indicted for commission of rape,334 Pennsylvania
has a twelve year limitation period 335 and Iowa has a ten year limitation
period. 336
Whereas the state of Connecticut has eliminated a statute of
limitation requirement as to a rape prosecution under certain
circumstances, 337 it is Georgia where the reform has led to perhaps the
most puzzling result. For most felonies, there is a four year period after
the crime’s commission during which there must be an arrest or
indictment, or else an individual cannot be charged. 338 That period of
time increases to seven years if the crime is such a severe one as to be
punishable by death or life imprisonment. 339 One would expect that a
murder charge would, as is generally the case in most states, have the
longest statute of limitations associated with it, but that’s not the case.
For rape, the case a prosecution can commence for a fifteen year period
after the commission of the crime. 340
There are a number of reasons that help explain the radical changes
in the application of statutes of limitations to the crime of rape. Firstly,
the change is a reflection of the perception today that rape is a much
more serious crime than had been thought in the past. Connecticut
Governor, M. Jodi Rell, presiding over a ceremonial bill-signing in
2007, commented on the new law which would abolish any statute of
limitations for rape in certain circumstances: 341
Make no mistake: Sexual assault is [a] violent crime – it is not a crime
of passion. . . . It is violence of the most personal and devastating
kind, as brutal in its own right as murder. And it deserves not only
harsh punishment but our very best – and unswerving – effort to bring
the perpetrators to justice. Today Connecticut takes another step in
that direction. 342

no statute of limitations for a rape charge), IND. CODE § 35-41-4-2 (2008) (stating there is no statute
of limitations for a rape charge if it constitutes a class A felony).
334. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277 § 63 (2008).
335. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5552 (2007).
336. IOWA CODE § 802.2 2007).
337. See supra note 10.
338. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1 (2007).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See supra note 10.
342. Press Release, The Office of Governor M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell Highlights New Law
Eliminating Statute of Limitations in Rape Cases with DNA Evidence (Aug. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=2791&Q=391712 (emphasis added).
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The rape reformers’ focus on the traumatizing impact of a sexual
assault on the victim has led to the realization that the victim, at times, is
not able to discuss the incident until many years have passed. Statutes of
limitations had the effect of precluding any prosecution of an accused if
the set number of years had transpired before the victim was able to
come forward. Another factor weighing against the traditional time
period is that there have been recent instances of “recovered memory,”
where therapy or hypnosis has enabled a victim many years after the
rape to remember what exactly occurred that was so traumatic.
But, for some states at least, the advances in DNA testing which
could enable fairly certain identification many years afterwards of the
individual who committed the rape, have been most significant. 343 The
traditional weakness in testimonial evidences as it ages and memories
fade and witnesses disappear, are compensated for by the near-certainty
of DNA identification. In rape cases where consent is not the issue, but
rather identification of the attacker is, indictments have been issued in
the name of “John Doe, unknown male,” in instances when DNA tests
have been possible from evidence recorded from the scene of the crime
and the attacker was not apprehended. 344 The expectation is that that
such a timely indictment satisfies the requirement of the statute of
limitations, and if subsequently there is a DNA match that comes up
from some jurisdiction’s databank, the suspect’s name can be substituted
for “John Doe” and the prosecution will proceed. 345
Many states do not require such an indictment in order to prosecute
an individual for an unlimited period of time after the occurrence of the
rape. Oklahoma, for instance, while having a general statute of
limitations for rape of twelve years, 346 permits a prosecution to
commence at anytime if there has been a DNA profile obtained from
physical evidence. 347 And Georgia’s fifteen year statute of limitations

343. Governor Rell of Connecticut, when signing the bill eliminating Connecticut’s statute of
limitations for rape, emphasized the import of DNA technology in identification of rape suspects.
See id.
344. See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Rapists Shouldn’t Be Able to Run Out the Clock, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 12, 2000, at C19.
345. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the District Attorney, shortly before the six year statute of
limitations was due to expire, charged “John Doe” with the rape based on DNA markers. The D.A.
commented that, “[s]omeday, somewhere, we hope this guy comes up in somebody’s databank. . . .
And we’ll nail him.” Id.
346. 22 OKLA. STAT.22, § 152(C)(1) (2007)
347. § 152(C)(2)(b).
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for rape 348 does not apply if DNA evidence is recovered; after that
period, the prosecution can be commenced at anytime. 349
XVIII. SEXUAL REGISTRY LAWS AND RESTRICTIONS ON LIBERTY
Heightened scrutiny of those who have been convicted of rape in
recent years has led to a belief that those charged with sexual assault are
likely to commit another such crime after they are released from
custody. Reforms that have occurred in response to this perception had
taken two different paths. The first reform has been the creation of
sexual registry laws.
Congress, in response to a horrifying crime, enacted the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act in 1994. 350 The Act created a national Registry
requiring all states and municipalities to submit data to the Registry;
failure to comply would lead to a 10% reduction in federal funding
allocated under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 351
The Act succeeded in its goal: every state has created a sex offender
registration program. 352
The Jacob Wetterling Act has been amended five times since its
enactment, 353 most importantly, the 1996 amendment commonly
referred to as Megan’s Law. 354 The effect of that law was highly
significant, it provided for public dissemination of the names of those
who had registered. Megan’s Law was followed by the Pam Lynchner
Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 355 the Jacob

348. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1 (2007).
349. Id.
350. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901(1) (2006). Jacob Wetterling was an 11 year old who was believed to have
been abducted in 1989 by released sex offenders in Minnesota. Steven Costigliacci, Note:
Protecting Our Children From Sex Offenders: Have We Gone Too Far? 46 FAM.CT REV 180, 18283 (2008). The high degree of publicity concerning the crime led Minnesota to create a state
registry to contain the names of released sex offenders. Id.
351. Id. The Omnibus Crime Control Act 42 U.S.C. § 3758 (2006) disbursed $1.09 billion to
the states in 2006; $2.7 million was the minimum allocated to any one state. Costigliacci, supra
note 350, at 182.
352. See State Statutory Surveys Sex Offender Registration (West 2007).
353. Costigliacci, supra note 351, at 181.
354. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
355. Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236,
110 Stat. 3093 (1996).
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Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997, 356 Jennifer’s Law, 357 and the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. 358 Finally,
in 2006, the Jacob Wetterling Act was repealed by Congress and
replaced with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006. 359
As is often the case, the federal legislation prompted states to
expand upon what Congress has enacted. As of 2007, 22 states and
hundreds of municipalities have passed laws prohibiting those convicted
of sexual offenses from living near schools, playgrounds, parks, or day
care centers. 360 One major problem with these reforms is that there
simply is not any evidence available to support these residential
restrictions. There is no research of any sort that has substantiated a
claim that living in close proximity 361 to the specified locations increases
the likelihood of sexually recidivating. The Medical Director of the
New York State Psychiatric Institute has commented on an additional
concern: “When there’s a great degree of restrictions on sex offenders, it
becomes almost impossible for them to find an acceptable neighborhood,
and they wind up being homeless and then even harder for us to
track.” 362
There is certainly no empirical research that has demonstrated that
residential restrictions provide a viable strategy for reducing sexual
assaults. 363 Nevertheless, there is widespread popular support for these
laws. In California, for example, a referendum prohibiting sex offenders
from living within 2000 feet of a park or school had overwhelming
support from voters. 364 To be sure, there is the perception of the public

356. Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 246171 (1997).
357. Jennifer’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14661 (2000).
358. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-36, 114
Stat. 1464, 1537-1539 (2000).
359. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901(1) (2006).
360. See Jill Levenson et al., Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Sensible Crime Policy or
Flawed Logic?, FED. PROBATION 2, 2 (2007).
361. It is common for jurisdictions to define a 1000-2500 distance as being in close proximity.
Id.
362. I, New York, TIME OUT NEW YORK, Feb. 28-Mar. 4, 2008, at 6 (quoting Richard Krueger,
M.D., medical director of the Sexual Behavior Clinic at the New York State Psychiatric Institute),
available at http://www.timeout.com/newyork/articles/i-new-york/26921/sex-offenders. There are,
as of February 2008, over 26,000 registered sex offenders in New York State, including 5,700 in
New York City. Id.
363. Levenson et al., supra note 360, at 2.
364. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

57

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

1038

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

that a high percentage of sexual offenders are likely to commit such
crimes in the future.
That is a perception shared by lawmakers as well. The legislative
purpose behind the passage of the New York State Sexual Offender
Registration Act clearly identifies the concern:
The legislature finds that the danger of recidivism posed by sex
offenders . . . and that the protection of the public from these offenders
is of paramount concern or interest to government. The legislature
further finds that law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their
communities, conduct investigations and quickly apprehend sex
offenders are impaired by the lack of information about sex offenders
who live within their jurisdiction and that the lack of information
shared with the public may result in the failure of the criminal justice
system to identify, investigate, apprehend and prosecute sex
365
offenders.

The opening sentence of this statute certainly hints at the greater
incidence of recidivism by sex offenders than by those convicted of
other crimes. Not only is there lack of empirical support for such a
claim, 366 but a study by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2002 actually
found much higher rates of recidivism for larceny (75%), burglary
(74%), auto theft (79%), and driving while intoxicated (52%). 367
It is the desire by state authorities to watch over and regulate ex-sex
offenders that raises serious concerns. If the registration and regulation
is a form of punishment of the sex offender, the prohibition against
double jeopardy would be violated. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .” 368 The
Supreme Court, in Benton v. Maryland, 369 ruled that the Clause was
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 370 The Supreme Court, in Witte v. United States, 371
interpreted the ban to prevent the government from “punishing twice, or
attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense” 372

365. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (Consol. 2008).
366. See Levenson et al., supra note 360 .
367. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002).
368. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
369. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.784 (1969).
370. Id. at 787.
371. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S 389 (1995).
372. Id. at 396 (emphasis omitted).
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The individual served his time and no additional punishment can be
inflicted upon his departure from prison. States get around this most
serious problem by insisting that the defendant is not being punished by
having to register, or by being told that he is not permitted to live in
certain areas. The state is merely engaging in regulation of ex-cons.
And those ex-cons have no reason to expect to have the same rights as
others. The New York State Legislative Findings regarding the rational
for the Sex Offender Registry statute continued:
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced
expectation of privacy because of the public’s interest in safety and in
the effective operation of government. In balancing offenders due
process and other rights, and the interests of public security, the
legislature finds that releasing information about sex offenders to law
enforcement agencies and, under certain circumstances, providing
access to limited information about certain sex offenders to the general
public, will further the primary government interest of protecting
vulnerable populations and in some instances the public, from potential
373
harm.

It is difficult to maintain that causing the ex-sex offender to “wear a
Scarlet Letter” 374 identifying himself as “Sex Offender” is going to
prompt an easy reintegration of that person into the community.
Landlords have ready access to sex registry records and often will refuse
to rent to a sex offender. The antagonism of many toward living near an
ex-offender can be illustrated by residents in Connecticut who petitioned
the local tax assessors to lower their local property taxes because of the
reduction in the value of their homes brought about by an ex-sex
offender moving into their neighborhood. 375
The community
notification and public dissemination provisions, which publicize where
an offender lives and information about his crime, have led to
widespread labeling, ostracizing, and attacks on the ex-offender. 376

373. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (Consol. 2008).
374. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850). Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote
the novel, The Scarlet Letter, in 1850 and describes a situation in Boston in the Seventeenth Century
wherein a woman must wear the scarlet letter “A” on her chest to indicate to all that she had
committed adultery. See id.
375. Corey Kilgannon, Woman With a Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at B5.
376. Id. In areas where there is no active dissemination of information by the police about the
residences of ex-offenders, groups of citizens may take on that function. An organization in Suffolk
County, New York, Parents for Megan’s Law and the Crime Victims’ Center, compiles detailed
data about sex offenders and distributes the information to neighbors. Id. Updates such as a change
in automobile used by the offender are provided regularly. The organization received in March,
2008 a $593,000 federal grant to administer the program on a national level. Id.
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When this is coupled with the financial instability that results from
employer reluctance to hire such an individual, re-entry into society
becomes difficult indeed. Even if the offender does not reveal his past,
many employers check with local registries to see if the potential
employee has been registered as a prior sex offender. If rape is, as many
feminists believe that it is, an act of violence prompted by aggression,
anger, and hatred, then isolating and stigmatizing the ex-offender may
well prove to create bitterness and resentment and be counterproductive.
XIX. CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AFTER RELEASE
FROM PRISON
Another post-rape-conviction reform is the enactment of statutes
aimed at prohibiting the freedom of a rapist after the prison sentence has
been completed. The same double jeopardy claim exists —an individual
cannot be subjected to additional punishment once the originallyimposed sentence is completed. Although an individual may well regard
being denied his freedom because he has been civilly committed to a
mental institution as a punishment, statutes providing for such
commitment claim to be for the purpose of rehabilitation or for the
protection of the society at large. Statutes for commitment of sex
offenders are designed to apply when no mental disease or defect can be
shown, and therefore the more traditional involuntary commitment
statute would not apply.
Although civil detainment statutes can be traced back to a 1937
Michigan law, 377 the real impetus for the recent enactments has been the
ongoing rape reform movement. The early statutes, often referred to as
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender statutes, provided for civil
confinement of sexual psychopaths and deviants based on a finding that
a particular individual would be likely to commit a sexual offense as a
result of his mental disease or defect. 378 These statutes applied even
when the individual had not actually committed a crime or had been
incarcerated prior to such commitment.
These first sets of statutes providing for civil commitment of sex
offenders hit a major roadblock when the Supreme Court decided

377. See John Fabian, Examining Our Approaches to Sex Offenders & the Law: Kansas v.
Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental Abnormality” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs.
Emotional Abnormality and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2003).
378. Id.
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Baxstrom v. Herold, State Hospital Director, 379 and Specht v.
Patterson. 380 In Baxstrom, the Court reviewed a New York State statute
authorizing prisoners to be committed to a state mental hospital at the
expiration of their prison sentences. The statute was similar to the
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender laws, except that it applied to
individuals who had been incarcerated for any, not just a sex, offense.
The Court’s unanimous decision invalidated the statute because
there was no jury review of the decision to civilly commit the
prisoner. 381 The Court also held that the equal protection rights of the
individual had been denied. The Court reasoned that since he had not
been incarcerated at the time the decision was made that he was to be
civilly committed, he should have been entitled to a full hearing as to the
issue regarding his alleged status as a dangerously mentally ill
individual. 382 The petitioner in Specht had been convicted of a sex
offense and, in accordance with the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, 383 was
to be civilly committed to a state hospital for an indeterminate period
which may have been for the remainder of his life. 384
The Court dealt directly with the claim that the procedures for
committing a convicted sex offender to a state mental hospital were civil
in nature and therefore neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable. 385 The
Court held that even though the claimed purpose for the civil
commitment was not designated as retribution, but rather to keep
individuals from engaging in future harm, it was, in fact, criminal
punishment. 386 The statute had led to a violation of due process because
there was no provision for counsel for the individual nor the opportunity
to present evidence on his own behalf prior to being civilly
committed. 387
The civil commitment for sex offender statutes had clearly received
a setback, as the designation of such commitment as a civil or as a
criminal matter was crucial. However, the impact of the reformers of the
1970s and 1980s, and the change in the society’s view of rape, altered
the court’s perspective on civil commitment. In 1986, the Supreme
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
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Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
Id. at 110, 115.
Specht, 386 U.S. at 607 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (West 1963)).
Specht, 386 U.S. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 608-09.
Id.

61

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
KLEIN_FINAL

1042

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:981

Court took a large step back from the Baxstrom and Specht decisions of
the 1960s. 388 In Allen v. Illinois, 389 the Court was confronted with a
situation wherein the sexual assault charges against the defendant had
been dismissed by the trial court after a preliminary hearing, finding that
there was a lack of probable cause to conclude that the defendant had
committed the assault. 390 The state then embarked, in what it claimed to
be a civil proceeding, to have the accused deemed to be a “sexually
dangerous person” and thereby committed to a maximum security
mental institution. 391
The accused’s claim was that the proceeding which found him to be
dangerous was in reality a criminal one and therefore one at which he
should have been afforded all of his constitutional protections. 392 The
accused claimed than the mere fact that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act designated proceedings covered by the Act to be civil and
not criminal should not be dispositive. 393 Indeed, the Court had decided
just six years prior to Allen, in United States v. Ward, 394 that if such a
process is “punitive in either purpose or effect” it can negate any
intention by the state to have the matter deemed civil and must be
considered criminal with accompanying privileges and protections. 395
The Court in Allen, however, in a 5-4 decision, concluded that
proceedings for civil commitment under the Act were to be considered
civil and not criminal and, therefore, the Due Process Clause was not
applicable. 396 The state’s purpose in committing an individual under the
Act was not punitive, but rather therapeutic for the individual and
protective of the safety of other citizens of the state. 397
But it was the 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Hendricks 398 that has most directly endorsed the reform of civilly
committing an individual immediately upon conclusion of his prison
sentence. Hendricks was the first individual that Kansas had attempted
to cover under its Sexually Violent Predator Act. 399 The Act was

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id. at 367-68.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
Id. at 251.
Allen, 106 S.Ct. at 375.
Id. at 373.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S 346 (1997).
Id. at 350.
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designed to commit those who do not have a mental disease or defect, so
a traditional civil commitment statute would not apply. 400 The state
legislature had determined that commitment was required because
“sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of
predatory sexual violence is high.” 401 No empirical evidence nor any
research studies, were referenced for this conclusion. The fifty-nine year
old Hendricks was not exempted from the generalization about sexual
offenders. The Act provided for an indefinite commitment because “the
treatment needs of this population are very long term and the treatment
modalities for this population are very different than the traditional
treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the
[general involuntary commitment statute].” 402
Hendricks maintained that such confinement was most assuredly
punishment and that proceedings under the Act were, therefore, criminal
in nature. 403 Hendricks argued that he had served his full ten year prison
sentence, and such additional loss of liberty constituted double
jeopardy. 404 And the loss of liberty could be for the remainder of his
life. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, concluded that the
Act was “civil in nature” and therefore the “initiation of its commitment
proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution.” 405 And whatever
Hendricks may think to the contrary notwithstanding, “involuntary
confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive.” 406 The ex post facto
claim was similarly dismissed; there was no new punishment for an act
previously committed because confinement under the Act does not
constitute punishment. 407 Even confinement for life. Even confinement
in, as was the case, a unit that was physically within the prison
system. 408
Even though the Kansas Sexual Violent Predator statute had been
upheld by the narrowest of margins, many jurisdictions proceeded to

400. Id. at 350-51.
401. Id. at 351.
402. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a 01 (West 1994).
403. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 369.
406. Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
407. Id. at 370. The four dissenters strongly disagreed. The Act, Justice Breyer wrote, “was
not simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further punishment
upon him.” Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 368.
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pass similar laws. 409 By early 2007, nineteen states had enacted civil
commitment programs for sexual offenders; a special report for the New
York Times deemed such confinement to be “a growing national
movement.” 410 New York became the twentieth state as the then newlyelected Governor Eliot Spitzer signed, with a great deal of ceremony, the
first major piece of legislation of his short-lived administration—a civil
commitment for sexual offenders bill. 411 Congressional legislation,
signed by President Bush, provides money to states that civilly commit
sex offenders after the prison term has been served. 412 Conditions in the
civil commitment facilities have been found to “look and feel like
prisons, with clanking double doors, guard stations, fluorescent lighting,
cinder-block walls, overcrowded conditions and tall fences with razor
wire. . . .” 413
But it should not be assumed that such prison-like conditions
constitutes punishment.
The Supreme Court in Mark Seling,
Superintendent, Special Commitment Center, Petitioner v. Andre
Brigham Young, 414 considered such a claim. The state of Washington
enacted a statute, the Sexually Violent Predators Act, 415 virtually
identical to the Kansas law considered in Hendricks. 416 Young’s claim
was that, as applied to him, the statute was punitive and therefore
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 417 It was not a frivolous
claim—a court-appointed psychologist assigned to write a report on
conditions in the Washington Commitment Center did conclude that “the
Center was designed and managed to punish and confine individuals for
life without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting.” 418 The
Center was located within a larger prison operated by the Department of
Corrections (DOC) and the DOC was actively involved in the
management of the Center. 419
The Ninth Circuit concluded in Young v. Weston 420 that
409. Grant Morris, Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1177, 1190 (2004).
410. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007.
411. Wrong Turn on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A18.
412. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 410.
413. Id.
414. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
415. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (LexisNexis 2008).
416. Seling, 531 U.S. at 259-60.
417. Id. at 258
418. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
419. Id.
420. Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7

64

Klein: An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform
KLEIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:19 PM

AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM

1045

Hendricks 421 had not precluded a challenge to the statute as applied to a
particular individual. 422 The actual conditions of confinement could
well lead to a conclusion that the effect is punitive and, therefore, the
statute would no longer be deemed to be a civil one. 423 The Circuit
determined that if the conditions at the facility were as claimed, Young
would be entitled to relief. The case was remanded to the District Court
to hold a fact finding hearing. 424 No such hearing, however, was to take
place; the Supreme Court granted the state’s request for certiorari. 425
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Circuit. 426 An “asapplied” analysis would prove unworkable because conditions at such
facilities are subject to change. 427 The Act was civil in accord with
Hendricks, and could not be deemed to be punitive as applied to a single
individual. 428 There was, therefore, no valid Double Jeopardy claim.
There could not be, as suggested by the dissent of Stephens, an inquiry
into the “effects of the statue.” 429 “Civil” is civil, treatment (even if
there be none) is not punishment, loss of liberty for the duration of one’s
lifetime is not punitive.
Since the legislation of virtually all of the states provide for an
indefinite period of commitment (subject to an annual review) the
population in the facilities is an aging one. These likely-to-commitfuture-sex-offense predators need wheelchairs and walkers, and senility
is an increasing occurrence. 430 Hendricks is now 72, but it’s certainly
not expected that he’ll be released. He has much company in Kansas,
where the cost for the civil commitment of sex offenders has increased
from $1.2 million in 2001 to $6.9 million in 2005. 431
XX. THE DEALTH PENALTY FOR RAPE OF A CHILD
The last time that someone was sentenced to the death penalty for
rape was in Mississippi in 1964. 432 The Supreme Court held, in 1977 in

421. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
422. Young, 192 F.3d at 874-75.
423. Id. at 873.
424. Id. at 877.
425. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 263.
428. Id. at 267.
429. Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
430. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 410.
431. Id.
432. Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than Raped? The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital
Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2004).
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Coker v. Georgia, 433 that executions for rape violated the Eighth
Amendment in that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 434 The
plurality opinion of Justice White explained:
[r]ape is without a doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity and of injury to the person and to the public, it does
not compare with murderFalse We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is
an excessive penalty for the rapist. 435

Justices Blackman, Stevens, and Stewart joined Justice White;
Justices Brennan 436 and Marshall’s 437 separate concurrences reflected
their determinations that the death penalty in all circumstances is cruel
and unusual punishment. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment
because he concluded that the rape in this case was not one of excessive
brutality and no serious, longlasting injuries had resulted. 438 The dissent
of Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, opined that
legislating in this matter should be left to the states, and the federal
courts should not intervene. 439
As a result of Coker, there was no statute in the country providing
for the death penalty for rape until Louisiana enacted such a law in
1995. 440 The statute initially provided for a possible death sentence
when there is oral, anal, or vaginal intercourse with someone under the
age of twelve, 441 but the law was subsequently amended to make the age
under thirteen. 442 The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the statute the next year in State v. Wilson and
Bethley, 443 because two different lower courts had quashed indictments
finding the statute to be unconstitutional. 444 The state supreme court
held that the death sentence was not excessive and that the Louisiana

433. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
434. Id. at 592.
435. Id. at 598. The decision certainly did not diminish the severity of the act of rape: “It is
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt of the person integrity
and autonomy of the female victim . . . . Short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self.” Id.
at 597.
436. Id. at 600.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 601.
439. Id. at. 604.
440. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2)(a) (1997).
441. § 14:42 (D)(2).
442. See § 14:42 (A)(4).
443. State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996).
444. Id. at 1065.
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statute was significantly different from the situation that the Supreme
Court had considered in Coker. The Louisiana court noted that the
Supreme Court referred fourteen times in its Coker decision to the
victim as an adult woman. 445
The Louisiana court concluded that due to the adult/child
distinction, Coker did not directly apply to the newly-enacted statute.
The court concluded that “given the appalling nature of the crime, the
severity of the harm inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed on
society, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty for the crime of
rape when the victim is a child under the age of twelve years old.” 446
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, emphasizing the
jurisdictional problem in this pre-enforcement challenge to the law—the
petitioner had neither been convicted nor sentenced. 447
Within several years of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,
five other states – Oklahoma, 448 Montana, 449 Texas, 450 South Carolina451
and Georgia 452 —started the process of enacting statutes providing for
the death penalty for rape of a juvenile. But it was Louisiana that first
actually imposed the sentence of death for the commission of a rape. In
January, 2008, the Supreme Court agreed to review the sentence of the
defendant and determine whether the imposition of a death sentence for
the rape of a child was constitutional. Shortly before the petition for
certiorari was granted, 453 a second individual in Louisiana was also
convicted of rape and was scheduled to receive a sentence of death as
well. 454 These are the only two individuals in the country who are on
death row for the commission of a crime other than homicide. 455
The individual sentenced to death in the case before the Supreme
Court, Patrick Kennedy, is a forty-three year old African American

445. Id. at 1066 n.2 (providing the fourteen excerpts from the Coker decision, each about one
sentence in length).
446. Id. at 1070.
447. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115(K) (West 2008).
449. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3)(c)(i) (2008).
450. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (Vernon 2007).
451. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (c)(I) (2007).
452. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1)(2) (2007).
453. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 957 So.2d 757 (La. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3113 (Jan. 4,
2008).
454. Letter from Jeffrey L. Fisher, Counsel for Petitioner, Stanford Legal Clinic, to the Clerk
of the Supreme Court of the United States Re: Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (December 13,
2007).
455. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Court to Rule on Death Penalty for Child
Rape, http://www.ScotUSblog.com/wp/court-to-rule-on-death-penalty (Jan. 4, 2008, 2:58 EST).
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whose IQ has been measured at 70. 456 His only prior convictions were
for writing five worthless checks between the years 1987 and 1992. 457
Race has long been a factor both in the prosecution of rape in this
country and in the implementation of the death penalty. In the pre-Civil
war south, slaves convicted of rape were hung, whereas whites so
convicted were not. 458 During the years 1930-1964, 89% of those who
had been executed for rape were black. 459 And in the state of Louisiana,
every single one of the fourteen men executed for rape during that period
was black. 460
A major concern in any consideration of a child rape statute is the
reliability of a child witness. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the case before
the Supreme Court, the alleged victim was eight at the time of the rape
and had initially claimed that two boys on a bicycle had taken her from
the garage and one of the boys attacked her in the yard. 461 This account
is what the girl repeatedly told the police, doctors, her mother,
investigators, a psychologist and a social worker. 462 The girl continued
with this version of the event until she told her mother, twenty-one
months later, that it was Kennedy who had raped her. 463 An Amicus
Curiae brief filed on behalf of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers focused on children as witnesses and maintained that
“[h]istory is replete with examples of damning false accusations made
by children . . . .” 464 It surely is the case that children may be
particularly susceptible to suggestions by others, even if the form of
suggestion is as apparently benign as repeated questioning by those in
position of authority. 465
456. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2007) (No. 07343).
457. Id.
458. Id. at 21 (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 139-42
(2002)).
459. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2007) (No. 07343) (citing United States Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, Bulletin
No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1967, at 7 (Aug. 1969)).
460. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343).
461. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343),
2007 WL 4104370.
462. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 9, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343), 2007 WL 4104371.
463. Brief in Opposition to Petition of Certiorari at 6-12, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07343), 2007 WL 4104370.
464. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note, 462, at 4.
465. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci, Maggie Bruck & Robert Rosenthal, Children’s Allegations of
Sexual Abuse: Forensic and Scientific Issues, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 494, 506 (1995) (noting
that scientific research clearly shows that some children make false claims of sexual abuse when
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The focus of the Supreme Court’s decision will undoubtedly be on
the issue of whether or not a sentence of death for child rape is grossly
disproportionate, excessive, and in violation of the Eight Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The Louisiana statute
encompasses not just vaginal intercourse but also deems oral-genital
contact 466 a capital crime. 467 There is no requirement that the child
under the age of thirteen was in any manner forced to engage in the
sexual contact. Mistake of fact as to the age of the victim is not a
defense. 468
XXI. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND WAVE OF RAPE
REFORM LAWS
Will the Second Wave reforms be more of a success in terms of
impact than the original reforms had been? If prison sentences are
longer, if sex offenders are civilly committed 469 and not walking the
streets or going to bars, if death awaits the rapist of a child, 470 then
predators who might pose threats may simply not be able to attack
members of the community. It is more difficult to see what benefits can
come from the sexual registry statutes, 471 but all of these post-conviction
reforms depend upon a conviction of the individual who did commit the
crime of rape. And the long existing problems which make a conviction
so difficult to achieve, continue.
In any “He said, She said” battle, the prosecutor’s burden of proof
creates a very real obstacle. Even were a jury to be more persuaded by
the alleged victim’s account than that of the defendant, such does not
necessarily lead to a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Corroboration may not be legally required any longer, 472 but jurors may
still wish to see more evidence than just the claim of the woman. And

adults in position of power pursue them with suggestive comments); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (suspicion of child testimony is warranted because studies
have demonstrated that children are “substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults . . . .”).
466. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A) (2008).
467. § 14:42(D)(2). See also Brief of the National Association of Social Workers, the
Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, the Texas Association Against Sexual Assault, and
the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3,
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829, (No. 07-343), 2007 WL 3444963.
468. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(4) (2008) (“Lack of knowledge of the victim’s age shall
not be a defense.”).
469. See supra notes 377-431 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 432-467 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 350-375 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
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biases, perhaps more common amongst male than female jurors,
continue. If a woman was at a bar drinking late at night and then went to
the apartment of a man she had never met before, many jurors will think
“she was asking for it”even if they are never permitted to be informed of
the clothing the woman was wearing. 473 Many still tolerate, if not
admire, the sexually active and aggressive man while viewing such a
woman as promiscuous and loose. The stereotyping will continue even
if the woman is shielded from questions about her prior sexual history.
Her motive for finally telling people she was raped only after much time
had passed since the alleged attack will still be suspect even after a rape
trauma syndrome expert explains that many women react that way. 474
No shield laws protect the jurors from finding out that the woman
had a lot to drink that night, and the jury then concluding that the alcohol
may have lowered the woman’s inhibitions. The jurors will know about
any past drug use or mental history or prior criminal record or motive to
lie. Jurors might be influenced by the highly publicized occasions when
women may well have lied about being raped – whether the defendant
was a Duke University lacrosse player 475 or Kobe Bryant. 476 A woman
who has indeed been raped may simply not want to press charges and
face a trial where the mere recounting of the events may lead to a
retraumatizing of the horrible sexual assault. And whatever instructions
the jurors may receive on affirmative consent, if the jury concludes that
the defendant reasonably believed there to have been consent, an
acquittal may still result.
But, however influenced jurors might be by their prejudices, bias,
and overall suspicions of the claim of rape, judges may act quite
differently. The vast majority of criminal cases, including rape, do not
go to trial. 477 Defendants often are persuaded by a judge’s assessment of
a case and by the judge’s pressure on the defendant to enter a guilty plea.
Whether judges are appointed or elected, they know there is little
sympathy for the person charged with rape. Judges may not be eager to
preside over a trial where a defendant is acquitted of rape, that is not the
way to curry the favor of interest groups that may be needed either for
473. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 300.
476. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
477. In 2004, the last year for which statistics are available, 83% of all those convicted of rape
had entered a guilty plea, 13% of convictions resulted from a jury trial and 3% from a bench trial.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, State Court Sentencing of
Convicted Felons 2004: Distribution of types of felony convictions in State courts, by offense, 2004,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.htm.
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reappointment or for promotion to a higher court. 478
Political
correctness does not cease when one enters the door of a courtroom.
There is much a judge can do to affect the outcome of a trial –
evidentiary rulings deciding motions, the extent of discovery permitted,
treatment of witnesses and counsel, and the instructions to the jurors
may all carry great weight. 479 Jurors often look to the trial judge for
cues as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The defendant who is aware of how he will be restricted at the trial
regarding cross examining his accuser, while also knowing that any prior
record of his relating to sexual offenses will become known to the jury,
may be quite tempted to plead guilty to avoid trial. The defendant will
know that many potential jurors have been greatly influenced by
society’s change in perspective of the severity of sexual assault and that
many female jurors would not be eager to tell friends and colleagues that
they voted to acquit, and therefore free, a man charged with rape. 480 If
the defendant is a black man and his accuser white, any calculation as to
the risk of going to trial will consider the possible impact of race on the
jurors. The existence of the sexual offender registry laws provide
prosecutors with a strengthened hand in plea bargaining in that a
defendant may readily plead guilty to a reduced charge that would not
require registering as a sexual predator upon completion of his
incarceration.
XXII. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the rape laws that existed in the early 1970s needed to
be reformed. They reflected age-old prejudices and unfair, pervasive
doubts about the credibility of any woman who claimed to have been

478. An example of how judges perceive and respond to the public’s attitude to those accused
of rape is illustrated by a recent study of judges in Pennsylvania. It was found that judges as their
re-election approached, increased their sentences for those who were convicted of rape. Adam
Liptak, Rendering Justice With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A1.
479. For a comprehensive discussion of the varying ways that a judge can influence the course
of a trial and affect the outcome, see Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the
Plea Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1401-04 (2004).
480. Attempts continue to educate Americans about the frequency of rape as well as its
devastating impact on victims. April, for example, is Sexual Assault Awareness Month and Take
Back the Night demonstrations occur at college campuses throughout the country. Susan Dominus,
Rape Worn Not on a Sleeve, But Right Over the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at B2. One
addition to the Take Back the Night rallies this year is expected to be the weaving of T-shirts
emblazoned with the word “Raped” on the front. The goal of those who designed the shirt is to
encourage everyday conversation about rape and to diminish the guilt and shame that may afflict
victims. Id.
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raped. When a woman did decide to confront the criminal justice system
and pursue criminal charges against her attacker, she was met with
obstacles that the legal system had put into place to thwart a fair
resolution of her charges. The law wouldn’t accept her word alone, and
even though rapes are almost always done in a private setting with no
witnesses present, corroboration was required. 481 It was expected that if
a woman really had not consented to the intercourse she would have
“resisted to the utmost” in spite of the use of overwhelming physical
force against her. 482 If the charges did survive the legal impediments
that were in place and the woman testified at trial, her prior sexual
relations would be revealed with subsequent attacks on her character. 483
And if the case reached the point where the judge instructed the jurors,
the judge would inform the jury of the need to be suspicious of any
claim by a woman that she was raped. 484 Husbands were protected as a
matter of law – by definition, a husband’s forcible sexual assault of his
wife would not constitute rape. 485 But, have the reforms that were
designed to counter such inequities gone too far? Have the Due Process
rights that must be afforded any individual charged with a crime been
sacrificed when the charge is rape? Has the pendulum swung so far as to
create a system of policies and laws that are fundamentally unfair? 486
To fully answer that question, one must look at the reforms in their
totality. It might well be the case that any single legislative reform was
justifiable, but have the odds against the defendant become inappropriate
and unjust in a criminal justice system that champions its unique place in
the world because of its protections for those charged with crime? Has
481. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. The American Bar Association was an
early critic of the corroboration requirement. In 1975, the House of Delegates approved a
Resolution in support of the elimination of laws mandating corroboration as part of an overall call
for the “development of new procedures for police and prosecutors in processing rape cases.”
House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges redefinition of Rape, and Undoes the Houston
Amendments, 61 A.B.A. J. 463 (1975).
482. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 57-97 and accompanying text.
484. Id.
485. See supra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
486. The need to compensate for past inequities became a perspective of judges as well as
reformers. One Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge wrote that he believed it was necessary
to emphasize the appalling truth that the law – the criminal justice system – has not been
a mere passive observer to the legal injustice perpetrated upon the rape victim, or to the
legal bonanza afforded the rapist. It is fitting then that the law generally, and this Court
particularly, embrace this opportunity to help to rectify the imbalance, to actively and
affirmatively encourage the physical and psychological treatment of rape victims and the
reporting of the crime to the police.
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 482 A.2d 126, 143 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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the crime of rape become an exception to these protections, and if so,
should it be?
Some of the reforms are of particular concern. Foremost, perhaps,
is the abolition in some jurisdictions of the requirement that in order to
hold an individual responsible for a criminal act, that person must have
had a mens rea, a guilty mind. For one to be guilty of a crime in our
justice system, it has historically been required that the individual
possessed the intention to cause harm, or the knowledge that he was
causing harm. 487 No conviction where the loss of liberty may be as
severe as it is for rape should result if the defendant had no mens rea;
this is a basic and an extraordinarily vital aspect of our system of
criminal justice. 488
Yet, the doctrine of affirmative consent and the decisions of some
states to extend that concept even further, are deemed by some to be
progressive reforms. Silence, preceding and during sexual relations,
ought not be deemed sufficient to transform intercourse into a rape. In
some jurisdictions, an accused can be convicted even if he believed there
was consent, even if such a belief was a reasonable one, 489 and even if
there was no indication whatsoever, no physical or verbal resistance, of
the lack of desire for the intercourse.
A defense of mistake of fact – that the defendant was truly mistaken
about a requisite element of the offense – is a valid and long recognized
defense in our justice system. 490 But, increasingly, not for the crime of
rape. Strict liability, a principal of criminal law most commonly
reserved for minor offenses, may apply; rape, according to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, “requires no culpable state of mind.” 491
In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and the
standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. But, for those states that have
not adopted a strict liability perspective of rape and still permit the
defendant’s belief that there was consent to be a defense to the charge,
the defendant may well have the burden of proof. Instead of the
historical requirement that the state prove each element of the offense –
487. Some criminal statutes, generally signifying less serious offenses, identify the requisite
mens rea as recklessness or negligence. The definitions of each of these concepts lack precision,
and there is frequent disagreement among courts as to their meaning. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 35, at 220-21.
488. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (due process requires that the burden is on
the state to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). The mens rea identified
within a statute is a crucial element of a criminal offense.
489. See supra notes 152-206 and accompanying text.
490. State v. Glenn Reid, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984).
491. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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and lack of consent is the crucial element – it now may well be the case
that the defendant must prove there was consent by a preponderance of
the evidence. 492 And in the eyes of some rape reform advocates, sexual
intercourse should be deemed rape even if there was consent at the time,
but afterwards the woman felt as though she’s been violated. 493
A defendant’s ability to even establish that there is a reasonable
doubt that he committed the rape has certainly been made more difficult
in recent years. Rape shield laws, precluding a defendant from
conducting a cross examination of his accuser that would inquire about
her prior sexual conduct, have been expanded in ways that could not
have been foreseen when the initial legislation was passed. Desire by
judges to comply with “the spirit” of such laws has led to situations
where jurors are denied knowledge of events that occurred prior to the
rape that are crucial for any proper assessment of the credibility of the
alleged victim. 494
It is not just the state’s control over what the jury may learn about
what the woman had done or said prior to the rape that may determine
the outcome of the trial. Recently-enacted statutes or court holdings
now permit a prosecutor to call an expert witness to explain the woman’s
conduct after the alleged rape when there is concern that such conduct
may be perceived by jurors to be inconsistent with that of a true rape
victim. Testimony by a rape trauma syndrome expert will explain why
the alleged victim told no one about the horrible attack for many days or
months. 495 Jurors will hear how women other than the complainant have
been terribly traumatized by a rape, and how their lives have been
destroyed. 496 Such testimony, certain to elicit great sympathy from the
jurors, occurs even though the expert has never met or spoken with the
alleged victim in the case on trial. 497 The mere fact that the rape trauma
expert is permitted to testify will infer to the jurors that there has been a
determination by the expert, and perhaps by the judge as well, that the
That is prejudicial, and perhaps
complainant was raped. 498
overwhelmingly so. It is the very essence of prejudice for juries to make

492.
493.
(1987).
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006).
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 82
See supra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text.
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emotionally-based decisions which may not have been founded on hard,
real, and relevant evidence.
Whereas the alleged victim may be shielded from relevant
questions being asked about her past even though victims of other
crimes receive no similar protections, the defendant himself receives
significantly less protection if he is charged with rape than would
normally be the case in a criminal matter. Traditionally, juries are not
permitted to be informed of the defendant’s prior criminal record due to
the prejudice that might attach. 499 In a rape case, however, propensity
evidence is admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides that
when, and only when, the defendant is accused of a sexual assault,
evidence of prior sexual assault offenses are admissible. 500 The
“evidence” is not limited to convictions – uncharged crimes may be
admissible, arrests that never led to prosecution are admissible. The
testimony of someone coming forward in 2008 to claim that in 1998 the
defendant had sexually assaulted her is admissible even though that
individual had never informed anyone previously of any assault. The
undue prejudice that could well result against the accused 501 was of no
import to the legislators in Congress, the Congressional concern was
centered on the goal of increasing the likelihood of a conviction of
someone charged with rape. 502
Whereas previously unproven accusations can be admitted into
evidence against the defendant, the very identity of the defendant’s
accuser for the instant case may not be revealed. Newspapers will shout
out the name of a well known sports figure or celebrity who has been
accused of rape, but will not reveal the identity of the accuser. The
media will provide protection to the accuser either voluntarily, through
self-censorship, or in compliance with the laws that exist in an
Such policies undermine the
increasing number of states. 503
presumption of innocence. The rationale for not revealing the accuser’s
name is to protect her from further humiliation and victimization; she
has been victimized once by the defendant, it should not happen again.
Such protection is based on an assumption that the woman has been the
victim of a rape by the defendant, she has been severely harmed, she has
been violated, her identity needs to be withheld—she has been raped.
Statutes prohibiting any mention of the clothing the accuser was
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
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wearing before the intercourse occurred may appear to be noncontroversial and clearly desirable. 504 After all, how is the dress of the
woman possibly indicative of whether she had consented to have
intercourse with the defendant? But if such information clearly was not
relevant, then no special statutes would be required to prohibit
admissibility. The fear is that jurors might find descriptions or
photographs of the woman’s outfit to be all too relevant. “We can’t trust
the jurors” is the rationale for exclusion. The jurors may conclude that
the woman was leading the defendant on by the see-through blouse and
very short skirt. Or, a juror might feel that the accuser “was asking for
it.” Stereotypes certainly do still haunt us – there’s the “bad girl,” and
the “good girl.”
But is it fundamentally fair to keep some truths out of the truthfinding process? Is justice best served by limiting information for those
who must make the very hard choice in determining who is telling the
truth? If the defendant’s claim is that he believed there to be consent,
isn’t it necessary for the jury to develop a complete understanding of
whatever factors he maintains may have played a role in the formation of
his belief? And doesn’t that include an understanding of the alleged
victim’s communications and conduct leading up to the sexual
interaction? There is a clear distinction between evidence being
admissible as relevant and it being deemed decisive and conclusive.
Shouldn’t a jury have all the facts before it, including all of the
information that may have some degree of relevance, some degree of
materiality prior to reaching a decision that could lead to the accused
losing his liberty for the rest of his life? If one is to err, shouldn’t the
choice be to permit evidence in and allow the jury to determine what if
any weight ought be given to the evidence? And, as part of the jury’s
assessment, the prosecutor on closing argument is always free to
maintain and attempt to persuade the jurors that they should give no
weight whatsoever to any information regarding the background of the
accuser or her prior relationship with the defendant.
Reforms of rape laws have had very substantial impact on what
happens after any conviction. Even if one escapes a sentence of life in
prison, punishment hardly ends upon release from incarceration. Civil
commitment of a convicted sex offender occurs with increasing
frequency, and such internment can most certainly be for life. 505 If,
however, one is not so detained in an effort by the state to hospitalize

504. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 377 -431 and accompanying text.
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people for crimes they may commit in the future, then compliance with
sex registry laws as a sexual predator awaits. Social isolation, verbal
and physical attacks from neighbors, and the inability to attain
employment or housing are just some of the ramifications of this
particular reform. 506 And the branding as a sexual offender may
continue for the remainder of one’s life. 507
The goals of the reformists were not just to change the laws relating
to rape, but to change society’s view regarding the need for women to
have autonomy in sexual relations. Criminal laws concerning rape were
seen as instruments to attain the broader goal of educating the
community, much as the early laws of the civil rights movement had an
impact on changing the popular culture as to racial matters. 508 But is it
fair to convict any single individual and deprive him of his liberty in
what may be an unjust and unfair proceeding in order to “create a new
cultural understanding of female sexuality?” 509 Should any individual
accused of rape be denied the opportunity to present relevant testimony
on his own behalf, a right which the Supreme Court deemed to be a
“fundamental element of due process law?” 510
The laws concerning rape which were in existence in the 1970s
reflected centuries of stereotypical thinking about a woman who accused
a man of sexual assault. Reforms were needed, and radical revisions
ensued. There are, however, serious concerns which now must be
addressed regarding the nature and extent of these reforms. The vast
majority of all of the exonerations in this country as of 2008 which were
based on DNA evidence have been for those wrongfully convicted of
rape. 511 A trial which may have been fundamentally unfair to the
accused is a very high, and unjust price to pay for the pervasive changes
in the laws relating to rape.

506. See supra notes 350-376 and accompanying text.
507. See id. Whereas sexual predator registries have the effect of creating many obstacles in
the way of ex-offenders re-integrating into society, attempts proceed to help others get community
support as they are released from prison. See e.g., David Gonzales, With An Ex-Inmate’s Help,
Returning to Life Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at B1.
508. See Little, supra note 20, at 1356.
509. PEGGY REEVES, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 292 (1996).
510. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
511. Adam Liptak, Consensus On Counting The Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2008, at A14 (noting that “almost all” of DNA exonerations have been in rape cases according to
the Innocence Project). See also Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised By Rape Trials, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1590 n.25 (2002) (noting most of those shown to have been wrongfully
convicted had been convicted of rape).
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